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FOREWORD
This report is one of five documents covering the results of the Space
Station Crew Safety Alternatives Study conducted under Contract
NASI-17242. The study documdntatlon is designated as follows:
Vol. I - Final Summary Report (NASA CR-3854)
Vol. II - Threat Development (NASA CR-3855)
Vol. III - Safety Impact of Human Factors (NASA CR-3856)
Vol. IV - Appendices (NASA CR-3857)
Vol. V - Space Station Safety Plan (NASA CR-3858)
This document is a precursor to space station safety planning. The
document is structured to form a basis for safety planning throughout the
life of the Space Station Program.
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SPACESTATIONSAFETYPLAN
INTRODUCTION
The United States Space StationProgram,whose objectiveis to place a
permanentmanned presencein low earth orbit by the 1990's, is dedicatedto
the most cost effectiveapplicationof the nationalresources. The objective
of the Space StationSafety Program,in supportof this nationalgoal, is to
ensure its achievementwith minimum exposureof the space stationassetsand
personnelto unwarrantedrisk. Tilesafetyprogram'sapproachis to realize
minimum risk exposurewithout levyingundue designand operational
constraints. This will be accomplishedby synergisticallyworkingwithin the
design and operationalplanningcommunitiesand achievethe safestlong-term
space stationprogramoperationspossiblewith the lowest resourcecommitment.
Implemmentingthis approachwill includeearly specificationof safety
criteriaand requirementthroughpreliminarysafetyassessments. This will
ensure early identificationof safetyissuesand avoid costly subsequent
program adjustments.
SAFETY PHILOSOPHY
A safetyphilosophystatesthe level of safety desired.
The Space Station safetyphilosopi_is to
ensurethat no damage to the Space Stationor
injuryto the crew will cause a suspensionof
operations.
This level of safety is bracketedby l) allowingno damage to the Space
Stationand no injuryto the crew - a desirablebut costlyapproach,and by 2)
crew survivalat the expense of the Space Station. The latter implies
evacuationand rescueas a minimum. A safety philosophythat requiresa level
of safetywhich will normallyallow continuedoperationsis a reasonable
trade-offbetweenacceptingno risk and stationabandonment.
PLAN DEFINITION
The Space StationSafetyPlan is a managementtool to be used by the
entire Space Stationcommunity- and those who will be directlyor indirectly
involved- to identifyand dispostionrisks associatedwith the definition,
development,phase-in,build-upand operationsof the Space Station. Figure l
identifieseach of the Plan parts and their application.
PURPOSE
The purposeof the Space StationSafety Plan is to ensure that safety
impactingcontingenciesthat may arise throughoutthe life of the Space
Stationare identified,or will be identified,and ensuringthat planning
preceedsthat relatedincrementof the Space StationProgramis implemented.
Tiffsplan will be constantlychangingin order to addressthe most
recent data and to update the next Space Stationprogramincrementprior to
its implementation.Toward this end, this plan containsadministrativeand
data appendicesthat will allow the safetycommunityto effect changesto
optimizethis document'seffectivenessas a safetymanagement(DSM's)
developmentand implementationtool.
SECTION QUESTIONSANSWERED
PLAN •WHYA SAFETYPLAN?
BODY •WHATDOESIT DO?
oHOWIS THE PLANMAINTAINED?
I •WHOCOMPRISESTHE SPACESTATION
ADMINISTRATIVE SAFETYTEAM?
APPENDICES oWHATARE THE PROGRAMREQUIREMENTS?
• HOWCANTHE SAFETYPROGRAM
GOALS/OBJECTIVESBE DISSEMINATED?
• HOWIS A SAFETYASSESSMENTTO BE
DONE?
• WHATIS THE SAFETYPROGRAMS
CURRENTSTATUS?
• WHATARE THE SAFETYPLANTASKS?
DATA • WHATDATAARE AVAILABLETO
HELPTHEDESIGNATEDSAFETY
APPENDICES MANAGER(DSM) DOHIS JOB?
Figure 1 Safety Plan Parts and Application
SCOPE
This Safety Plan concernsall agencies- government,educationaland
industry- who are part of the team that definesthe Space Stationconcept,
preparesits design requirements,integratesthe design,developesoperational
requirements,manages the developmentplanning,designs,develops,fabricates,
tests and preparesfor operationand supportof the station. AppendixAA
lists Space StationDesignatedSafetyManagers. This appendixidentifiesthe
playersfor each specificphase of the program. This appendix,as it is
updated,will provide a continuityfor the DesignatedSafety Managers
associatedwith the Space Stationduring its lifetime.
The plan itself is an advisorydocumentwhose safetyobjectives,during
each Space Sttion program increment,are to be identified. These objectives
are definedas safetycriteria,safetyguidelinesand safetydesign/procedural
requiremennts. If these objectivescannotbe achievedreadily,it is
incumbentupon the relatedincrementDesignatedSafety Managerto advise the
IncrementProgramManagerof the risks associatedwith not satisfyingthese
safetyobjectiveswithin the ProgramManager'sarea of responsibility.
Objectivesthat cannot be resolvedshould be assessedfor risk acceptance,
with reasonswhy the unresolvedSafetyObjectivewill not expose the Space
Stationresourcesto an unacceptablecalamity. These incidentsof risk
acceptanceare to be documentedin the plan, as noted. Figure 2, indicates
the approachto be used to identify,assess and resolve/acceptrisks on the
Space StationProgram.
As the safety plan data are aggregated,the plan becomesa historical
file of safetyobjectives,risks, risk acceptancesand safety personnel
involved. These data are includedin the plan directlyor by reference.
SAFETY PLAN APPLICATION
To supportplan implementationwithin the variousSpace Station
jurisdiction,a sampleorientationbriefingis included(AppendixAB). The
responsibleDesignatedSafetyManagers (DSM's)can structurethis briefingto
incorporatethe plan objectivesand tasks, within the area of responsibility.
Additionalbriefingdates are availablefrom his tier-DSM.
SELECT STRATEGY APPLYCONTROLS iCONDUCT ONGOINGi
REVIEWSTO ENSURE_
• DESIGNTO eMISSION RISK CONTROL i
PRECLUDE REQUIREMENTS i
SAFETY _ •DESIGN TO -OPERATIONAL _ >CRITERIA i i CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
REQMNTSIF'l _ I IDENTIFYRISKS
• PROVIDE • DESIGN & SUBMIT FOR
I LESSONSLEARNEDII I PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS PROGRAM
SUPPORTING I SPECIALSTUDIES DEVICES ACCEPTANCE
l ANALYSTSI -PROVIDE $
_ OPERATIONAL
.OOD POAL TDESIGNOR ASSESS IDENTIFYM MAGAINST HA_RD I TRACKRISK i HA_RD iOPERATION RISK • ACCEPT DATABASE i STATUSi STATUSDEFINI TI THREAT IS UES RISK
MENU &CONTROL I ] __
,_ , A b _ _VERIFICAT_
DOCUMENT UPDATE I _-'--
HA_RDS HA_RD I
ENTERINTO DATABASEI
NASA & HA_RD I
ELECTRONIC
DATABASE
Figure 2 Risk Assessment Process
SAFETYPLANADMINISTRATION
Administration of the plan and its task coordination is expanded in
Appendicies AC, AD, AE and AF.
SAFETYPLANTASKS
Currently identified plan tasks are listed in Appendix AG. This listing
is organized by program increment, identifying safety task products. Updating
of this appendix is shared by all program Designated Safety Managers.
SAFETYPLANSUPPORTINGDATA
The "B" series data appendicies are to provide a commonand current
safety data base for each Designated Safety Manager for application within his
area of responsibility. Supporting data appendicies will be added as required.
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
AppendixAA
DESIGNATEDSAFETYMANAGER ROSTER
A centralizedsafetyorganizationclearlyidentifiablewithin the
managementstructureshall be establishedto assurethat all safetyactivities
have timely planning,implementationand effectivetechnicalsafety
management. A DesignatedSafetyManager (DSM)shall be appointedto manage
the safety programand coordinatewith other functionalorganizationson
matters relatedto programsafety.
This appendixis to insureall DSM's are identified,togetherwith all
pertinentinformation,to assurean integratedcoordinationof effort and
programdocumentation.
The followinginformationis recommendedas a baselinefor all DSM's
assignedto the Space StationProgram.
o DSM's Name and Title
o OrganizationRepresented
o Organization'sAddressand Phone Number
o DepartmentNumberand Mail Code
o DSM's Home Addressand Phone Number
o DSM's Agency/ContracturalArea of Responsibility
o DSM's BackgroundSynopsisand Credentials
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
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AppendixAB
ORIENTATIONBRIEFING
It shallbe within the DesignatedSafetyManager's(DSII)area of
responsibilityto advisethe responsiblemanagementof the obligationsand
objectivesof the Space Station'sprogram. To insurethese aspectshave been
addressed,a "SpaceStationSafety ProgramOrientationBriefing"shouldbe
preparedand maintainedcurrentfor the DSM's area of responsibility.An
up-to-datecopy of this briefingshouldnot only be made availableto
managementwithin his area of responsibility,but also to his upper tier
DesignatedSafetyManager.
The pages that follow includesuggestedbriefingcharts that may be
incorporatedin the subjectOrientationBriefing. The minimumobjectivesof
this briefingshould includethe following:
I. Define the scope and philosophyof theSpace StationSafety Program.
2. Define the scope of the Space Stationorganizationto illustrate
the safety infrastructure.
3. Identifyto managementtheir safety responsibilitieswithin the
community(agency/corporate).
4. Definehow tileSpace Stationsafetyobjectivescan be achieved
within the designatedarea of responsibility.
5. Interpretthe safetycommunityadministrativeand trackingsystems.
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AppendixAC
SAFETYWORKINGGROUPS,BOARDSAND REVIEWS
The System safety organizationswill supportand/orparticipatein the
Space Station Inter-CenterSystemSafety WorkingGroups,the Senior Safety
Review Board, ProgramMilestoneReviews,ProgramManagementSafety Reviews,
and Safety ProgramReview activities.
a. Inter-CenterSystem SafetyWorkingGroup Meetings. The authority,
purpose,membership,and responsibilitiesof the Inter-Center
System SafetyWorkingGroup are definedin (TBD). The Groupwill
conveneon a periodicbasis to (1) maintaincognizanceof system
safetyactivities(2) maintainsafetycommunicationschannels
throughoutthe varioussystem safetyactivitiesand (3) review
hazardstatus. Meetingswill be scheduledand plannedby the Space
Station ProgramSafetyManager consistentwith programactivities
statusand milestoneschedules.
b. SeniorSafety ReviewBoard Meetings. The Senior Safety Review
Board purpose,scope, policy,responsibility,membership,and
proceduresare defined in (TBD). Supportto the Board will be
requiredfrom SafetyManagersto review open hazardsand closure
rationalefor acceptedrisks.
c. ProgramMilestoneReviews. Risk managementdata will be provided
in accordancewith IRL/IRD. These data shall be based on efforts
such as hazard analyses,failuremodes and effectsanalyses,human
factorsanalyses,and interfaceanalyses. These data shall be
presentedin adequatedetailto allow a managementdecisionas to
readinessto proceed,from a safety viewpoint,with the next
programphase or with plannedtest, flight,or on-orbitoperation.
d. ReadinessInspections. The Safetyorganizationshallparticipate
in readinessinspectionsprior to performingany operationor test
which is potentiallyhazardousto personnelor hardware,has a high
risk in terms of programsuccess,or involveshardware,facilities,
or effort of significantexpense. A safetyassessmentshall be
made of facilities,test articles,procedures,and personnel
training,experience,certification,and management. The Safety
activityalso includesan assessmentof previoustest or operations
data and visual inspectionof the operationalconfiguration.
The resultsof readinessinspectionswill be requiredfor
presentationat programmilestonereviewsif the operationis
relatedto a programmaster schedulemilestone.
e. ProgramManagementSafetyReviews. The safetyorganizationsshall
supportprogrammanagementsafetyreviewswhich will be presented
as agenda items at the programor projectchange controlboards.
Safetywill advisemanagementof open hazards,the actionsbeing
implementedto resolvethe hazards,the organizationresponsible
for the actions,and the expecteddate of resolution. The reviews
will includedescriptionsof new risks that have been identified
and the proposedrisk acceptancerationale.
29
f. Safety Program Reviews. Safety review teams, which may consist of
Headquarters, program, or project personnel, will periodically
review safety organizations, programs, and activities. The safety
organizations shall provide data consistent with the depth of
review to be conducted, and will verify internal compliance and the
compliance with system and occupational safety and health safety
requirements. A schedule of reviews shall be established at least
1 year in advance of the review and a file of the review results
shall be maintained for review. Participation by NASAin
contractor and subcontractor safety reviews will be at the
discretion of NASA.
(Extractedfrom "Safety,Reliability,Maintainabilityand Quality
Provisionsfor the Space StationProgram",ID200,para. 5.)
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AppendixAD
SAFETY PLAN CHANGE PROCEDURES
The DesignatedSafetyManager (DSM)shall evaluateall changes,waivers,
deviationsand any additionalhazardsidentifiedduringthis change process.
Processingof Safety Plan changeswill conformto the closed loop systemof
hazard reporting,data storageand the approvedfeedbackof correctiveaction.
This system shall be developed,implementedand maintainedas noted in the
basic flow chart, page AD-2. This procedureshall providechangesto hazard
data and summaryinformationas specifiedin the approvedand applicable
documents. The data elementsand formatsshall be consistantwith Space
Station InformationSystem Requirements. This informationsystemwill also be
utilizedfor maintaininghazard informationand to providethe capabilityof
accomplishinga completehazardsassessment. The DesignatedSafetyF1anager
(DSI4)shall be responsiblefor assuringcompleteand timely hazardchange
reportingand all entriesinto the electronicnetworksafetydata base at the
time of identificationand approval.
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Appendix AE
CURRENTSAFETYSUMMARY
The DesignatedSafety Manager (DSM)will providea monthly safety
summaryto his tier-DSMaccordingto the InformationRequirementsDescription
(IRD)of the contract. The purposeof the monthly safety summaryis to
initiatethe following:
I. Alert the communityto any safetyproblemsrequiringinter-agency
coordination. A suggestedoutline for the report (as further
definitizedby the contractIRD) could include:
a. Contractmilestones: completionof preparationfor related
status.
b. Risk issues.
c. Projectedactivities.
d. Safetyprogramissues.
2. Indicatesafetyissues that may be schedule/costrisk drivers.
3. Incrementallyupdatethe Space Stationelectronicsnetworkdata
base (safetyanalyses/tradestudies).
4. This Appendixcan providea data file for the DSM's monthly safety
summaries.
33
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AppendixAF
SAFETYASSESSMENTPROCEDURE
The metilodwhereby the DesignatedSafetyManager (DSM)ensuresthe
conductfor safetyassessmentof hardware,softwareand operations/procedures,
is to be includedin this appendix. An updatedcopy of these data will also
be forwardedto his tier-DSM. A suggestedprocedureis enclosed. This may be
expandedor modified to satisfythe risk assessmentneeds within a DSM's area
of responsibility.JSC Form ZZZ "SpaceStationHazard Report" is includedto
encourageuniformityin hazardreporting. Efforthas been initiatedto assure
this report formattingis includedin the Space Stationelectronicnetwork
Safety Data Base.
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SAFETYOPERATINGINSTRUCTION
MODULE/SYSTEMHAZARDANALYSISPROCEDURE
i
I
1.0 PURPOSE
The purposeof this SafetyOperatingInstructionis to definethe
procedureto be used in preparingsafety assessmentreports. This
SafetyOperatingInstructionfurtherdefinesa safetyanalysisand
safetyreviews in supportof which the safetyassessmentreportsare
prepared.
2.0 SCOPE
This SafetyOperatingInstructionappliesto a systemsafety engineerof
XXXX Companyfor in-houseprocessingof payloadhazardsassociatedwith
the Space Station (SS). This SafetyOperatingInstructionis based on
NHBXXX "SafetyRequirementsfor Space StationUsers, Experimentersand
InterfacingVehiclesand Hardware". Also the noncompliancereport
instructionis includedin this SafetyOperatingInstructionfor the
cases in which a safety requirementcannot be met.
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3.0 PROCEDURE
3.1 OVERVIEW
The followingstatementdescribeshow a safety analysis,a safety
assessmentreport,and a safetyreview are interrelated:
In supportof a safetyreview,a safetyengineerpreparesa safety
assessmentreportwhich documentsthe resultsof a safetyanalysis
performedby him/her.
In order to facilitateunderstandingof this interrelationship,this
sectiondefinesand furtherdescribeshazards,safety analyses,and
safety reviews.
3.1.1 THREATSAND HAZARD LEVELS
Althoughthere may be many secondaryor contributoryllazards,threats
are identifiedas the primaryconcernsapplicableto the Module/System.
Table l containsa selectedlist of the threatsand their descriptions.
During the analyticalprocessto identifyhazards,a safetyengineer
should attemptto define the hazards in terms of these threats. A
difficultycommonto all such lists is that there is a considerable
overlapbetweenthe threats,and assignmentof an unsafe act or
conditionto any one hazardgroup is arbitrary. What is importantis
that potentiallyhazardousitems or conditionsare identified,
described,and trackedthroughthe safetyreview process. Events or
conditionsthat affect the successof a Space Station'smissionor cause
loss or damage to payloadhardwareare not hazardsunless such events or
conditionsresultin a risk to the SS or personnel.
Hazardsare also classifiedwith respectto potentialas hazard levels.
There are two hazard levels. One is a criticalhazardwhich results in
damageto the SS equipmentor tileuse of contingencyor emergency
procedures. A catastrophichazard is the other levelwhich results in
the potentialfor loss of life or major injurywhich results in the
incapacitationof tilecrew or loss of the module, groundfacilities,or
SS equipment.
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3.1.2 SAFETYANALYSIS
A safety analysisis a techniqueused to systematicallyidentify,
evaluate,and resolvehazards. In order to identifythe hazards
applicableto a module/systemor its GSE, a safetyengineershall
conduct safetyanalysesboth at the system and subsystemlevels.
Typicallysuch analysesassessthe entire systemand its interfaceor
each of the subsystemsand their interfacesagainsta list of the hazard
groups shown in Table I. In addition,each systemand subsystemshall
be evaluatedto determinethe applicabilityof all the technicalsafety
requirementsof NHB 1700.7Aand KHB 1700.7. A safety engineermay use
the fifteensubsystemslisted and definedin JSC II123 to conductthe
safetyanalyses. However,the selectionof subsystemgroupingsare
arbitrary,and any convenientgroupingmay be used.
It is the responsibilityof a safetyengineerto conducta safety
analysisearly in the design of the module/system/GSEand to update that
analysisas necessaryas the designmatures.
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TABLE 1 TYPICAL THREATS
{
THREAT I DESCRIPTION
I
Collision hazards which occur where module/system
elements are allowed to break loose and impact SS
structure, other payloads, or flight and ground
personnel !
Contamination hazardsassociatedwith the releaseof toxic flamm-
able, corrosive,condensible,or particulatematter
Corrosion hazardsresultingfrom the structuraldegradation
of metallicand nonmetallicequipment
ElectricalShock hazardsresponsiblefor personnelinjuryor fatality
becauseof electricalcurrentpassingthrough any
portionof the body
Explosion hazardsresultingfrom the violent releaseof energy
as a resultof module/systemelementover-
pressurization,fire,chemicalreaction,excessive
temperature,malfunctioningequipmentor structural
failurecausingthe releaseand collisionof
equipmentwitilother structures
I
Fire I hazardsassociatedwith the rapid oxidationof
I module/systemelementcombustibles
I
Injuryand Illness { hazardscapableof inflictingpllysicalinjuriesor
I illnessof any sort on one flightor ground crews
I during all missionphases
I
Loss of Module I hazardswhich could degradethe structural,and
i thermodynamicintegrityof the space station.
i
Radiation i hazardsassociatedwith the exposureof the human
I body and sensitivecontrolequipmentto ionizing
I radiation,ultravioletor infraredlight, laser,and
i electromagneticor RF (radiofrequency)generating
i equipment
l
TemperatureExtremes I hazardsassociatedwith the departureof temperature
I from normal
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3.1.3 SAFETYREVIEWS
Four safety reviews (PhasesO, I, II, and III)are normallyconducted
for both module/systemdesignand flightoperationsand for Ground
SupportEquipment(GSE) designand ground operations. The four safety
reviewsare conductedby the safety reviewpanels at JSC, the SS flight
operator,and at KSC, the SS launch/landingsite operator.
The common objectivesof these safetyreviewsare to assess the safety
of each SS module/system,its associatedGSE, and ground operationsand
to assesscompliancewith the requirementsof NHB XXX, NHB 1700.7Aand
KHB 1700.7.
The Phase 0 safetyreviewsare informalmeetingschairedby a JSC safety
representativefor module/systemdesignand flightoperationsand a KSC
safetyrepresentativefor GSE designand groundoperations. TilePhase I
throughPhase III safety reviewsare formal reviewsconductedby the
safetyreview panels. During the formalreviews,a safetyengineer
shouldgive a presentationwhich includesa brief descriptionof tile
module/system/GSEand its operations,followedby data uniqueto the
phase being reviewed.
The timing,objectives,and safetytasks for each of the safety reviews
are summarizedin Table 2.
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TABLE2 SUMMARYOF SAFETYREVIEWPROCESS
PHASE TIMING SAFETYEFFORTS PURPOSEOF REVIEW
0 Module/System/ I. Perform preliminary I. Identify potential
GSEconceptual safety analysis, hazards and applicable
design estab- 2. Prepare a ground operations safety requirements.
lished concept (KSC).
I Module/System/ I. Define and expand safety I. Assess the preliminary
GSEpreliminary analysis to reflect the design against NHB
design preliminary design: 1700.7 and KHB 1700.7.
established a. Define hazards. 2. Evaluate preliminary
b. Define hazard causes, hazard controls and
c. Evaluate actions for safety verification
reducing or controlling methods.
hazards.
d. Identify approach for
safety verification.
2. Prepare a mission (or ground
operations) scenario.
3. Determine compliance with
NHB1700.7 and KHB 1700.7.
II Module/System I. Refine and expand safety I. Assess final design
GSEfinal design analysis, against NHB1700.7 and
established a. Evaluate interfaces KHB 1700.7.
and mission (or ground 2. Concur on specific
operations) procedures, hazard controls and
plans and timelines, safety verification
b. Update hazard descrip- methods.
tions, causes, and
controls.
c. Finalize test plans,
analysis procedures, or
inspections for safety
veri fi cati on.
2. Finalize description of
ground operations flow.
3. Determine compliance with
NHB1700.7 and KHB 1700.7.
III Module/System I. Complete safety analysis. I. Approval of safety
GSEfabrication 2. Prepare safety assessment assessment report.
and testing report. 2. Review of safety com-
complete. 3. Complete all safety verifi- pliance data package.
cation tests, analyses
and/or inspections. 3. Identify open safety
4. Prepare safety compliance items.
data package.
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3.2 SAFETY ASSESSMENTREPORTS
A safetyassessmentreportdocumentsthe result of a safetyanalysis
performedby a safety engineer. The safetyassessmentreport is then
maintainedand submittedby the safetyengineerto the module/system
safetyreviewpanels approximately45 days prior to each safety review.
The safetyassessmentreportgenerallycontainsthe following:
(1) Descriptionsof the module/system/GSEand its safety-critical
subsystems. A safety-criticalsubsystemis a subsystem
containingan elementof risk.
(2) Mission scenarioand ground operationsdescription.
(3) Requirementsmatrix.
(4) Hazard reports.
(5) Other data specificallyrequiredfor each safety review.
Instructionsfor completionof a hazardreport and a requirementsmatrix
are shown along with their forms in AppendixA and B of JSC 1380A,
respectively. The requirementsmatrix (JSC Form 000, SS Module/System
Safety RequirementsApplicabilityMatrix)containsthe assessmentof the
applicabilityof the technicalrequirementsof NHB 1700.7Awith respect
to each module/systemelement. From a safety view point, the hazard
reportsconstitutethe most importantelementof the safetyassessment
report.
Through the safety analysis,the safety engineerevaluateseach
identifiedhazard for means of eliminating,reducing,or controllingthe
hazard. The safetyengineeralso identifiesthe approachfor verifying
compliancewith the safetyrequirements. Then the safetyengineer
documentsthe resultsof this effort in a hazard report (JSC Form ZZZ,
HazardReport).
Among the data specificallyrequiredfor each safety review is Ionizing
RadiationSource Data Sheet (JSC Form 44 (RevisionlO-81)). The
IonizingRadiationSourceSheet providesthe informationwhich will
satisfythe initialJSC and KSC data requirementsfor radioisotope
sourcesand radiation-producingequipment. Paragraph5.3.3 of JSC
13830A providesadditionalinformationon this IonizingRadiationSource
Data Sheet.
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3.2 SAFETY ASSESSMENTREPORTS (Cont'd)
Detaileddata requirementsfor each safety revieware shown in
paragraphs5.2.1, 5.3.1, 5.4.1,5.5.2 of JSC 13830A. Tilesafety
engineershall satisfythese data requirementsin preparingthe safety
assessmentreports.
Up to the Phase II safetyreview,the safety engineersubmitsthe safety
assessmentreportwhich containsall the requireddata to the safety
reviewpanels. For the Phase III safetyreview,the safetyengineer
submitsto the panels a safetycompliancedata packagewhich includes
not only the safetyassessmentreportbut also other requireddata
describedin paragraph5.5.2 of JSC 13830A.
3.3 NONCOMPLIANCEREPORT
When a specificsafetyrequirementof NHB 1700.7Aor KHB 1700.7cannot
be met, the safety engineercompletesa noncompliancereportand submits
it for disposition.
Prior to the submittalof the noncompliancereport,the safetyengineer
must developappropriaterationalewhich definesthe designfeatures
and/or proceduresused to concludethat the noncomplianceconditionis
safe. All noncompliancereportsshould be coordinatedwith the
appropriateNASA centerprior to submittaland shouldbe submittedas
soon as it is determinedthat the safety requirementcannot be met.
A noncompliancereportcould be approvedeitheras a waiver or as a
deviation. A waiver is approvedfor a singlemissionwhile a deviation
is approvedfor more than one mission.
Section6.0 of JSC 13830Acontainsmore informationregardingthe
noncompliancereport,includingthe addressesto which the noncompliance
reportshall be submitted.
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PHASE TIME OBJECTIVES
0 Concept Identify safety-critical subsystems, groups,
hazards, and applicable safety requirements
for subsystems and associated ground
operations. (A safety-critical subsystem is
a subsystem containing an element of risk.)
I Preliminary Design Assess the implementation approach, review
Review (PDR) hazards and resolution, and develop an
understanding of verification approach.
II Critical Design Verify design compliance with requirements,
Review (CDR) review verification methods.
III Delivery to Validate the incorporation of previous
Customer safety review agreements, assure the
satisfactory completion of safety
verification activities, provide agreement
that safety activities have been
satisfactorily completed.
It is essential for a safety engineer to pursue the above objectives in
preparing each safety assessment report.
PROCEDURE
I. Hazard Groups and Levels
Since the identification of the SS module/system hazard is the necessary
starting point of a safety analysis, it is strongly needed to define the
hazard and hazard levels and to identify the hazard groups.
A hazard is the presence of any potential risk situation caused by an
unsafe act or condition. There are numerous potential risk situations
associated with the SS module/system which directly or indirectly affect
the safety of SS flight or ground personnel. Therefore, it is necessary
to identify such hazards to start a safety analysis.
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The following data are required for a phase 0 safety review:
a. Module/System description and operation.
b. Hardware description of safety-critical subsystems (existing
level, new and reflown). A safety-critical subsystem is a
subsystem containing an element of risk.
c. Completed module/system safety matrix. (Figure I)
d. Completed hazard list. (Figure 2)
The module/system description and operation should be of sufficient
detail to permit identification of all subsystems, with emphasis on
stored energy, which have potential for creating hazards.
3. Phase I Safety Review
During the early design phase, a safety engineer refines and expands the
safety analysis by evaluating each hazard for means of eliminating,
reducing, or controlling the hazard and by identifying the approach for
verifying compliance with the safety requirements. Then the safety
engineer documents the results of this effort on a hazard report form
(JSC Form ZZZ). Instructions for completion of the hazard report are
shown in Figure 3 on page II.
Each hazard report should stand alone; therefore, it must be supported
by data such as block diagrams, schematics, a description of
safety-critical subsystems and their operations, and nonmetallic
material and radioactive source information. The block diagram or
preliminary schematic should indicate the design approach which is
intended to control tile identified hazard. Partial diagrams and
schematics are satisfactory, provided that the element for hazard
control is identified.
Preliminarymaterialssafetyassessments(addressingflammability,off-
gassing,and materialscompatibilitywith hazardousfluidsas
applicable)should be conductedfor the phase I safetyreviewand
documentedon module/systemhazard reports.
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The followingdata,which must be submitted30 days in advance,are
requiredfor the formalpresentationat the phase I safetyreview:
a. Block diagrams,schematics,and/or a descriptionof
safety-criticalsubsystemsand their operations.
b. Hazard reports.
c. Module/Systemassemblyand checkoutoperationsto be conducted
at KSC, with preliminarytimelines.
d. Radioactivesourcequestionnaire.
In most cases, there are no radioactivesourcesinvolvedin the
module/systemhazard analysis. If a safetyengineerhas to deal with a
radioactivesource,he/she shoulduse a radioactivesource questionnaire
(JSCForm OOZ) shown in JSC 13830.
4. Phase II Safety Review
As the module/systemand GSE design is completedand refined,a safety
engineerfurtherupdatesand expandsthe safetyanalysis. The safety
engineerupdatesthe originalsignedhazardreports completedat phase I
to includeadditionaldata on controlof the hazardcauses and safety
verificationmethods.
The followingdata are requiredfor a phase II safetyreview:
a. Safety-criticalsubsystemdescriptions(update).
b. Engineeringdrawingsof safety-criticalsubsystemswhen
specificallyrequested.
c. Module/Systemassemblyand checkoutoperationsto be conducted
at KSC (update).
d. A list of safety-relatedfailuresor accidents.
e. A list of technicaloperatingproceduresrelatedto identified
hazardcontrolsand date of availabilityfor review.
f. Updatedhazardreportsand supportdata includingthe following:
(1) A list of equipmentgeneratinghazardousradiation.
(2) Radioactivesourcequestionnaire(update).
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5. Phase III Safety Review
The safetyanalysisis completedat the time of the phase III safety
review. A safety engineerupdatesand submitsthe hazard reports
completedat phase II for final approval. All the safetycompliance
data requiredby the SP&R (SafetyPolicyand Requirements)document
(NHBI7OO.7A)are submittedfor reviewat this time. The safety
assessmentreport,which is a part of the safetycompliancedata,
includesthe completedhazardreportsand the identificationof any open
safety item.
The following data are required for a phase III safety review.
a. Updates of safety-critical subsystems descriptions.
b. Updates of safety-critical subsystem engineering drawings when
specifically requested.
c. Results of applicable safety verification tests and analyses.
d. Safety compliance data as follows:
l) A safetyassessmentreportwhich documentsthe resultsof a
safetyanalysis,includinghazard description,controls,
and safetyverificationmethods (seeJSC 13830).
2) Approvedwaiversto safetyrequirements.
3) Radioactivesource questionnaire.
4) A list which identifiesand characterizesall RF
transmittersand all electromagneticradiationwhich
exceedsthe limit for cargo-producedradiatedfields as
specifiedin JSC 07700,Volume XIV, attachmentI. In
addition,the list shall includeequipmentcapable of
producinga field strengthmore than lO milliwattsper
squarecentimeterfor ground safetypurposes.
5) A log book maintainedon each pressurevessel/system
showingpressurizationhistory,fluid exposuresand other
pertinentdata shall be deliveredwith the module/system.
(For the phase III safetyreview,a summaryof the log book
is sufficient.)
6) A summaryof all safety-relatedfailuresor accidents
relatedto module/systemprocessing,test and checkout,
includingan assessmentof their potentialimpactto SS,
elementsof SS, and to ground safety,togetherwith action
taken to preventrecurrence.
t
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7) Detailedtechnicaloperatingproceduresfor launcil
operationswhich are hazardousin nature. There shall be
step-by-stepdirectionscoveringitems such as personnel
access controls,emergencyprocedures,and weather
restrictions.
8) A list of all uses of mercury and its compoundsin
accordancewith the data requirementsof paragraph209-Ib
of NHBI7OO.TA.
9) A list of all pyrotechnicinitiatorsinstalledor to be
installedon the module/system,givingthe functionto be
performed,the part number,the lot number,and the serial
number.
6. Waivers
When a specificsafety requirementcannotbe met, a safety engineer
completesa waiver request,JSC Form ZZZ. If the waiver request is for
flight,the safetyengineersubmitsit to the Manager,SS Operations
Office,code PF, JSC; if for GSE and groundoperations,to the Director,
Safety,R&A, ProtectionService,code SF, KSC.
All the waiver requestsshouldbe coordinatedwith the appropriateNASA
center prior to submittaland should be formallysubmittedas soon as is
determinedthat a safetyrequirementcannot be met. Each waiver request
will addressonly one hazard or hazardcause. After initial
coordination,a safetyengineerwill formallysubmitthe waiver request
for approval. The safetyengineerwill be formallynotifiedof the
acceptanceor rejectionof the waiver request.
Althoughthere may be many secondaryor contributoryhazards,ten basic
hazardgroupswere identifiedas the primaryconcernsapplicableto SS
module/systems. Table 1 on page 4 containsthe list of these hazard
groupsand their descriptions. These hazard groupsalso appear on a
safetymatrix (JSC Form ZZZ) which is requiredfor the phase 0 safety
review - see section2 of Procedure.
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Also, hazardsare classifiedaccordingto potentialas hazard levels.
There are two hazard levels. One is a criticalhazardwhich results in
damage to SS equipments,or the use of contingencyor emergency
procedures. A catastrophichazard is the otherwhich resultsin the
potentialfor personnelinjury,loss of the Module, ground facilities,
or SS equipment.
2. Phase 0 Safety Review
During the concept phase of the module/systemand GSE development,a
safetyengineerperformsa preliminarysystem-levelsafety analysisin
order to determinethe hazardgroups associatedwith the module/system
subsystemelementsand to identifythem. Then the safetyengineer
documentsthe resultsof this analysison a safetymatrix (JSC Form 000)
and a hazardlist (JSC Form ZZZ). Instructionsfor completionof the
safetymatrix and hazard list are shown.
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NO.
SPACE STATIONHAZARDREPORT
SYSTEM/OPERATION PHASE
SUBSYSTEM I THREAT I DATE
I I
I I
HAZARD TITLE
APPLICABLESAFETY REQUIREMENTS: I HAZARD CATEGORY
I I CATASTROPHIC
DESCRIPTIONOF HAZARD: I J _RIII_AL
HAZARD CAUSES:
HAZARDCONTROLS:
SAFETY VERIFICATIONMETHODS:
STATUS OF VERIFICATION:
I I
APPROVAL I ORGANIZATION I SS
I I
I I
PHASE I l I
I I
PHASE II ] I
I I
PHASE III I I
JSC Form ZZZ
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APPENDIXAG
SPACE STATION PROGR_4 INCRE_ENTS
SAFETYPLANTASKS
(Preliminary)
The purposeof this appendixis to identifysafety
tasks as they relate to the Space Station program
developmentcycle. Additionally,the task's products
are identified.
AUGUST 7, 1984 SPACE STATIONPROGR_ INCREMENTS/SAFETYPLAN TASKS (APPENDIXAG)
I. REQUIREMENTSDEVELOPMENT SAFETYTASKS SAFETYPRODUCTS/INPUTS
Integration Identify all Space Station program juris- Space Station Safety Plan (Update)
dictional elements and their Designated
Safety Managers (Agency & Contractor)
Prepare/Update Safety Plans for all Space Station Safety Sub-Plans
increments/elements identifying specific Appendix AG (Update)
detail safety tasks per increment
Mission Assess mission requirements to identify Safety Criteria Matrix
which criteria are mandated by mission
objectives
Identify new hazards/risk issues related Preliminary Hazard Analysis
to mission requirements
Operations Determine which operations are inherently Preliminary Hazard Analysis
hazardous (Update)
System Design Assess systemrequirementsto identify Safety CriteriaMatrix
which safetycriteriaare incorporated
in initialsystem specification
Add new designrequirementsto support Safety Design Guidelines
safetycriteria AppendixBD
Human FactorsDesign Review Human ProductivityContractdata Safety CriteriaMatrix
to determinewhich requirementssupport
safetycriteria
Reliability Determinewhich stated redundancies Safety CriteriaMatrix
supportsafetycriteria
Safety DevelopSafety requirementsin addition Safety DesignGuidelines
to those incorporatedin the mission,
operations,initialsystem designand
reliabilityrequirements
Maintainability Determineif maintainabilityobjectives Safety CriteriaMatrix
supportprecautionaryactions required
to maintain hazardoussytems,or conduct
hazardousoperations
MaterialControl Ensurematerialscreening,inventorying Space StationMaximum Threshold
and locatingcapabilityof Space Station Level Values; Inputto NHB XXY
MaterialControl Systemcan supportthe
maximum safetyallowablelevels,both
long term and for statedperiodsof time
(8-hrs/day,l-hr/day,or less)
Safety input into NHBYYY "Space
StationMaterialHandlingand
ControlRequirementsand
Procedures"(Draft)
2. INTERFACEDEFINITION(STATION-TO-
eeeeeee)
Station Developspace stationsafety requirements NHB XXX "SafetyRequirementsfor
to be applied to all interfacingelements Space Station Users, Experimenters
and InterfacingVehiclesand
Hardware"(Draft)
Shuttle Apply requirementsof NHBITOO.7Ato space InterfaceHazard Analysis
stationelementsto be transportedon STS (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
GroundSegment Apply requirementsof KHBITO0.7/ InterfaceHazardAnalysis
S_4TO HB S-lO0 for KSC/VAFBlocated (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
Space Stationground equipmentand
operations
Operations Assessprocedure/softwareinterfacesto Mission Hazard Analysis
identifyhazardousoperations
Maintenance Identifyhazardousmaintenanceactivities, Mission Hazard Analysis (Input)
includingmaintenance_lhosesynergistic
effectscould generatehazardoussituations
Apply requirementsof NHB XXX and NHB XXY InterfaceHazard Analysis
to all maintenanceactivities (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
Extra VehicularActivity (EVA) IdentifyhazardousEVA activitiesfor I_issionHazard Analysis(Input)
input into Mission HazardAnalysis
Apply requirementsof NHB XXX and NHB XXY InterfaceHazardAnalysis
to EVA activities,and EVA suit related (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
activities
OrbitalManeuveringSystem Identifycriticalfunctionsand/or Mission HazardAnalysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith the
OMS in concertwith the Space Station
Apply requirementsof HHB XXX and NHB XXY InterfaceHazard Analysis
to all OMS/SpaceStation interfaces (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
Orbit TransferSystem Identifycriticalfunctionsand/or Mission HazardAnalysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith the
OTS in conjunctionwith the Space Station
Apply requirementsof NHB XXX and NHB XXY InterfaceHazardAnalysis
to all OTS/SpaceStation interfaces (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
Tele-Operator¿4aneuveringSystem Identifycriticalfunctionsand/or Mission Hazard Analysis(Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
the TMS in concertwith the Space Station
Apply requirementsof NHB XXX and NHB XXY InterfaceHazardAnalysis
to all Tr_S/SpaceStation interfaces (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
User (All) DevelopSpace Stationsafetyrequirements NHB XXY "SpaceStationSafety
that are station,not mission peculiar RequirementsFor Operationsand
Maintenance(Draft)
User (Experimenter) Identifycriticalfunctionsand/or MissionHazard Analysis(Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
the U-E in concertwith the Space Station
Apply requirementsof NHB XXX and NHB XXY .InterfaceHazardAnalysis
to all U-E/SpaceStation interfaces (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
User (Production) Identifycriticalfunctionsand/or Mission HazardAnalysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith the
U-P in concertwith the Space Station
Apply requirementsof NHB XXX and NHB XXY InterfaceHazard Analysis
to all U-P/SpaceStationinterfaces (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
User (Surveillance) Identifycriticalfunctionsand/or Mission Hazard Analysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith the
U-S in concertwith the Space Station
Apply requirementsof NHB XXX and NHB XXY InterfaceHazard Analysis
to all U-S/SpaceStaton interfaces (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
SecondStation Identifycriticalfunctionsand/or Mission Hazard Analysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
Space Station-to-SpaceStation operations
Apply requirementsof NHB XXX and NHB XXY InterfaceHazard Analysis
to all Space Station-to-SpaceStation (ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
interfaces
Identifycriticalfunctionsand/or Mission Hazard Analysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith each
interfacingentity
Apply requirementsof NHB XXX and NHB XXY InterfaceHazard Analysesper
to all interfacesof each entity InterfacingElement
(ElementInterfaceAnalysisReport)
3. SYSTEMELEMENTDEFINITIONINTEGRATION
"CommonModule Structure Identifycriticalfunctionand/or MissionHazard Analysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
SystemElement and its operation
Initialhazard analysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, Element InterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
across an interfacewould be a safety
issue
Multi-BerthingAdapter Identifycriticalfunctionand/or Mission HazardAnalysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
System Elementand its operation
Initialhazardanalysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, Element InterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
across an interfacewould be a safety
issue
LogisticsModule Identifycriticalfunctionand/or Mission Hazard Analysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
System Elementand its operation
Initialhazard analysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, Element InterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
across an interfacewould be a safety
issue
Resource/PowerModule Identifycriticalfunctionand/or Mission Hazard Analysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
System Elementand its operation
Initialhazardanalysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, Element InterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
acrossan interfacewould be a safety
issue
LaboratoryModule Identifycriticalfunctionand/or Mission HazardAnalysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
System Elementand its operation
Initialhazardanalysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, ElementInterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
across an interfacewould be a safety
issue
Safe Haven Identifycriticalfunctionand/or _ssion HazardAnalysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
System Elementand its operation
Initialhazardanalysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, Element InterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
across an interfacewould be a safety
issue
Contamination/Decontamination Identifycriticalfunctionand/or Mission HazardAnalysis (Update)
Volume(s) hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
SystemElementand its operation
Apply requirementsof NHBYYY to equipment/ Mission HazardAnalysis (Update)
functionsrelatingto contamination/
decontaminationissues
Initialhazard analysis PreliminaryHazard Analysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, Element InterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
across an interfacewould be a safety
issue
RemoteManipulatorSystem Identifycriticalfunctionand/or Mission HazardAnalysis (Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
System Elementand its operation
Initialhazard analysis PreliminaryHazard Analysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, Element InterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
across an interfacewould be a safety
issue
SpecialUse Accessories/Tools Identifycriticalfunctionand/or Mission Hazard Analysis(Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
System Elementand its operation
Initialhazard analysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, Element InterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
o hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
across an interfacewould be a safety
issue
SpecialUse Accessories/Tools Identifycriticalfunctionand/or Mission Hazard Analysis(Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
SystemElementand its operation
Initialhazard analysis PreliminaryHazard Analysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, Element InterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
acrossan interfacewould be a safety
issue
Other Vehicles Identifycriticalfunctionand/or Mission Hazard Analysis(Update)
hazardousactivitiesassociatedwith
System Elementand its operation
Initialhazard analysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysis
(Update)
List all inter-elementinterfaces, ElementInterfaceAnalysis
identifyingcriticalfunctionsand/or
hazardousactivitieswhose bleeding
across an interfacewould be a safety
issue
4. STATIONDEVELOPMENTINTEGRATION
System RequirementsReview Ensure Safety Criteriaare implementedin Safety RequirementsMatrix
requirementsdocumentation
PreliminaryDesignReview Conduct preliminaryhazard analysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysisReport
Assess program tasks for safety Safety CriticalProcedures
criticality Matrix Appendix
Review systemsdocumentationfor safety Safety EngineeringAssessment
buy-off Log (Entry)
CriticalDesignReview Conductdetailedhazard analysis SafetyAnalysis Report
Preparepreliminaryproceduresfor safety Safety CriticalProcedures
criticaltask
Define safety verificationrequirements SafetyVerificationMatrix
Review system documentationfor safety Safety EngineeringAssessment
buy-off Log (Entry)
Preparerisk acceptancematrix Risk AcceptanceMatrix
CriticalDesignReview (Cont'd.)
First ArticleConfiguration Updatehazard analysis Safety AnalysesReport (Update)
Inspection
Design CertificationReview Finalizeproceduresfor criticaltask Safety CriticalProcedure (Update)
Preparesafetycertificationdocumentation Safety CertificationReport
DD 250 Buy-Off Reviewsafety data package Safety AnalysisReport (Final)
LaunchPreparation
Deliveryto Orbit
Outfittingand Assembly
Station/SystemsCheckout TBD
StationUser Systems Checkout
StationUser Phase-In
Full Operations
5. LAUNCH COMPLEXDEVELOPMENTINTEGRATION
System RequirementsReview EnsureSafety Criteriaare implementedin Safety RequirementsMatrix
requirementsdocumentation
PreliminaryDesignReview Conductpreliminaryhazardanalysis PreliminaryHazard AnalysisReport
Assessprogram tasks for safety Safety CriticalProcedures
criticality Matrix Appendix
Reviewsystemsdocumentationfor safety Safety EngineeringAssessment
buy-off Log (Entry)
CriticalDesign Review Conductdetailedhazard analysis SafetyAnalysisReport
Preparepreliminaryproceduresfor safety Safety CriticalProcedures
criticaltask
Define safetyverificationrequirements Safety VerificationMatrix
CriticalDesignReview (Cont'd.)
Review system documentationfor safety Safety EngineeringAssessment
buy-off Log (Entry)
Prepare risk acceptancematrix Risk AcceptanceI,latrix
First ArticleConfiguration Update hazard analysis Safety AnalysesReport (Update)
Inspection
DesignCertificationReview Finalizeproceduresfor criticaltask Safety CriticalProcedure(Update)
Preparesafety certificationdocumentation Safety CertificationReport
DD 250 Buy-Off Review safety data package SafetyAnalysisReport (Final)
Pre-LaunchOperations
LaunchOperations TBD
TurnaroundOperations
Monitoringand Control
6. GROUND/AIRSUPPORTLINK DEVELOPMENTINTEGRATION
SystemRequirementsReview Ensure Safety Criteriaare implementedin Safety RequirementsMatrix
requirementsdocumentation
PreliminaryDesignReview Conductpreliminaryhazard analysis PreliminaryHazardAnalysisReport
Assess program tasks for safety Safety CriticalProcedures
criticality Matrix Appendix
Review systemsdocumentationfor safety Safety EngineeringAssessment
buy-off Log (Entry)
CriticalDesignReview Conductdetailedhazard analysis Safety AnalysisReport
Preparepreliminaryproceduresfor safety Safety CriticalProcedures
criticaltask
CriticalDesignReview (Cont'd.)
Define safetyverificationrequirements Safety VerificationMatrix
Review systemdocumentationfor safety Safety EngineeringAssessment
buy-off Log (Entry)
Preparerisk acceptancematrix Risk AcceptanceMatrix
First ArticleConfiguration Updatehazard analysis Safety AnalysesReport (Update)
Inspection
Design CertificationReview Finalizeproceduresfor criticaltask Safety CriticalProcedure(Update)
Preparesafetycertificationdocumentation Safety CertificationReport
DD 250 Buy-Off Reviewsafety data package Safety AnalysisReport (Final)
Commandand Control
MonitoringData Assessment/Processing
StationOperationsPhase-In TBD
StationMaintenancePhase-In
User OperationsPhase-In
7. LOGISTICSOPERATIONSDEVELOPMENTINTEGRATION
SystemRequirementsReview
System/SubsystemReliabilityAssessment
System/SubsystemMaintainabilityAssessment
System/SubsystemMTBF Definition
Spares RequirementDevelopment
ConsumablesRequirementDefinition
MaintenanceEquipment/ToolsRequirementsDefinition TBD
GSE RequirementsDefinition
TrainingRequirementsDefinition
TrainingEquipmentRequirementsDefinition
Life Cycle Costing
MaterialInventory/ControlSystem Development
STS Scheduling/SchedulingRequirements
8. SPACE STATIONBUILD-UPOPERATIONS
Module(s)on Dock @ KSC
Module Launch Preparation
Module Launch to Orbit
InterimAirlockAssembly
Module Assembly
Outfitting
StationPersonalEquipmentAssessment TBD
StationSystemsCheckout
StationAccessories/ToolsCheckout
StationOperationsCheckout
StationMaintenanceCheckout
Station/EVACheckout
StationOperationalShakedown/Full-up
9. ON-ORBITOPERATIONS(STATION) TBD
lO.ON-ORBITMAINTENANCE(STATION) TBD
II. ON-ORBITOPERATIONS(USERS) TBD
12. STATIONEFFECTIVENESSASSESSMENT TBD
13. STATIONUPGRADING/REFURBISHMENT TBD
14. STATIONRETIREMENTS/DISSOLUTION TBD
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Appendix BA
APPLICABLEDOCUMENTS
SPACESTATIONSAFETYAPPLICABLEDOCUMENTS
NHBXXX "Safety Requirements for Space Station Users, Experimenters
and Interfacing Vehicles and Hardware"
NHBXXY "Space Station Industrial Safety and Health Requirements"
JSC I000 (TBD) Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Provisions
for tile Space Station Program
NHB1700.7A Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the STS
KHBI7OO.7A/ Space Transportation System - Payload Ground Safety HandbookSAMTOHBS-IO0
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APPENDIXBB II SEPT1984
PRELIMINARYSPACESTATIONCREWSAFETYTHREATLIST
The threats listed here are generic in that each threat may have more
than one possible cause. Further in this study, potential hazards will be
developed for these threats, allowing specific identification of controlling
safety criteria and guidelines.
The scope of issues covered are threats that affect crew health and well
being directly and threats that impact the space station and its ability to
continue functioning. Sources of threats can be external to the space
station,crew initiated,space stationhardware/softwareresponsible,or
generatedby hardware/softwareand processesdedicatedto space station
experiments,payloads,and cargo.
Design and operationalguidelineseventuallywill have to be drawn up for
the space stationand its dedicatedcrew equipment,for crew functions,as
well as for carry-ons: experiments,payloadsand cargo.
FIRE
A fire in an area containingsubsystemsequipment,electricalwiring, or
laboratoryequipment,or in personnelareaswhich damagesand puts out of
commissionall unprotectedoperatingequipmentin a compartment. Fire
preventionin designleans heavilyon isolatingthe elementsof combustion:
Fuel, Oxidizerand Ignition. In a two-gassystem (80% N2 and 20% 02) the fuel
is excludedonly if all materialsare screenedfor flammability. Applying
"NASAMSCRequirementTfor Materials and Processes", JSC-SE-OOO6B,through the
RI-SD Material Control (F_TCO) program screened shuttle materials for
flammability. In a 100% 02 environment (such as in EVApre-breathing areas),
all surface temperatures must be analyzed to ensure that no ignition sources
are available and the contained materials are not flammable at high 02
concentrations. "Environment Requirements and Test Criteria for the Orbiter
Vehicle", MFO004-OI4C, cites maximumallowable surface temperatures in each of
the compartments based on the potential fluid leaked into the compartment.
Fluid leaks are considered credible. Additionally, smoke/fire sensing and
supression could be included in DamageControl design.
LEAKAGE
Leakage of any gas or liquid which is produced, stored, or routed through
the pressurized areas of Space Station volumes, including any chemicals used
or that may be procuced in experiments. The leakage may occur at any point
through which the fluid is routed. Leakage rates must be assumed and
increased margins and/or system make-up capability must be included in the
design. Selection of materials and seals for faying surfaces is critical to
the life of the Space Station in orbit. Seal selection, expected life,
conditionat installation,and installationtechniquesdetermineleak
susceptibilityat all penetrations.
TUMBLING/LOSSOF CONTROL
Space Stationattitudemaintenancesystemsrequireat least
fail-operational/failsafe capability. Considerationof a requirementfor
maintenanceand returningthe systemto operablestatusshouldbe given.
Forces that may cause tumblingor loss of control,other than attitude
maintenancesystemfailure,could include: moments impartedby Orbiter/OTV
dockingor collision,fluid or gaseoussystemsleaking/venting,crew activity
_¢ithinthe station,and the like. Recoveryfrom and immediatereactionto
Space Stationtumblingshouldbe a system designrequirementincludingcenter
of gravityand mass distributioneffects.
BIOLOGICALOR TOXIC CONTAI41NATION
Contaminationthreatsare those associatedwith biologicalor toxic
contaminationof the food or water supply. All similarlypackagedfood stored
in any one area (e.g.,all vacuum-packedfood storedin one pantry)will be
assumedunfit to eat. Similarly,all potablewater in connectedtanks will
also be assumedtoxic; the water, however,may be reprocessedthroughthe
water purificationsystemand the tanks decontaminatedto renderwater
potable. This threat is associatedwith the releaseof toxic, flammable,
corrosive,condensible,or particulatematter. Contaminationis caused by
leakage,spillage,outgassing,loose objects,abrasionand from the growthof
fungus or releaseof volatilecondensiblematerials. Leakageof or out
gassingof hazardousmaterialsshouldbe preventedby eliminatingsuspect
materialsthrough{4ATCOscreening. Close looks at materialsinteractionsare
also required. Where hazardousmaterialsare broughton board, special
containmentconsiderationmust be given. All materialsbroughton board
should be screened,includingastronautpersonaleffects.
INJURY/ILLNESS
Physicalinjuriesmay be causedby impactor collisionwith stationary
objectshaving sharp edges or protrudingparts or with shrapnelor projectiles
from explodingtanks or acceleratedloose objects. Pilysicalinjuriesmay also
be caused by ingestingparticulatematter,touchinghot or cold surfaces,and
by breathingoxygen deficientair. Care and controlto preventsharp and
abradingprotrusionsand the inclusionof hand holds and other convenient
restraintsfor astronautsminimizesexposureto injury. Crew illnesscould
result from exposureto pathogenicbacteria,toxic materials,or to excessive
radiationlevels. The physiological/behavioralimpactof microgravityof tlle
crew for long time exposureis not clearlyunderstood. Personalhygieneand
close controlof food preparationminimizesexposureto illness. Crew illness
and injurymust be treatablewithin the Space Station. The sophisticationof
medical facilitiesis yet to be determined. Death of an astronautcannot be
ruled out, raisingthe questionof what procedureis to be followedfor the
dispositionof the remains,i.e.,.returnto earth or burial in space - burial
at sea precedence.
GRAZING/COLLISION
This threatconcernsinternalas well as externalelementsand can be
caused by structuralfailure,proceduralerror or inadequatestowageand
handlingrationale. Externalthreatscan be caused by Orbiter/OTVor EVA
astronautscoming into unplannedcontactwith the Space Station. A grazing
collisionwith anothervehiclewhich damagesequipmentoutsidethe spacecraft,
such as RCS jets, radiators,solarpanels,antennas,tanks, fluid lines,
dockingmechanisms,etc., is consideredhere. The collisionis not severe
enoughto cause a penetrationof primarystructurebut may damageexposed
equipment. Potentialcollisioncandidatesmust be identifiedand the specific
threatdefined.
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CORROSION
This threatconcernsstructuraldegradation of metallicand nonmetallic
equipment. Leakageof corrosiveor reactivematerialscan degradean
equipment'susefulness. Materialincompatibilityat joints of dissimilar
metalscan lead to corrosionwhen subjectedto internalenvironmentextremes
of temperatureand humidityacceleratingcorrosionin carbon or most organic
materials. Examplesof corrosiveprocessesincludestresscorrosion,
electrolyticcorrosion,and polymerization.Causativeagents includeacid,
salts,solvents,halogens,etc. The MATCON programis set up to screen
againstcorrosiveagents and processes.
MECHANICALD_4AGE
14echanicaldamage is definedas being causedby collisioninsidethe
veiliclewith loose out-of-controlmasses. Damage potentialof systems
requiresassessmentas to impacton mission continuation,type of emergency
precipitated,postulateddamage,protectionaffordablein designand mission
recoveryimpact. Externalcauses (Fire,Explosion,Collision,Penetrations,
Attack, Sabotageor Human Error)may not be preventable,requiresthat system
damage toleranceshould be a significantdesignconsiderationfor critical
systems.
EXPLOSION
In the event of an explosion,the damagewill be confinedto one
compartmentand will consistof overpressure,heat, shrapnel,and atmospheric
contaminants. All equipmentin the compartmentmay be damagedand made
inoperative,unless armor-platedfor protection. Violentreleaseof energy as
a resultof equipmentoverpressurization,fire, chemicalreaction,excessive
temperature,equipmentmalfunctionor structuralfailureare candidatecauses
for explosion. For instance,an explosionof .025 Ib TNT equivalent,
releasing50 BTU of energy in the form of heat, shock waves and kinetic and
thermalenergy of shrapneldamagecould be confinedto one compartmentand
would consist of overpressure,heat, shrapneland atmosphericcontaminants.
The equipmentwould requirerepair/replacement,dependingon the damage an
explosioncan produce. Further hazardswhich can resultin a compartmentby
such an explosion,such as fire, etc., shouldalso be consideredas part of
the threat. Walls and primary structure,or equipmentoutside the affected
compartment,would probablynot be damaged. (O21) Equipmentwhich can
disintegrateexplosivelyincludespumps,motors, blowers,rocketmotors,
generators,laser, etc. In excludingequipmentand materialsfrom Space
Sationhabitablevolumeswhose TNT equivalencyexceedsTBD, explosionimpact
can be minimized. Equipmentand materialmounted externallyto the Space
Stationhabitablevolumesthat exceedthe thresholdTBD TNT equivalencyshould
includeshrapneldivertershieldsto protectthe habitablevolumes from
catastrophicpenetrations. Guidelinesconcerningpressuresensing,relieving
and control,chemicalscreeningto preventuse of violentreagents,and system
heat rejectionare key elementscontrollingexplosionrisks.
LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION
A loss of pressurizationin a habitablevolumemay be caused by an
accidentalpenetrationof an outsidewall or bulkhead. Pressuresensing,
leakage and maintenanceimply the need for a DamageControlSystem on-board
the Space Station. Suclla systemwould includepressure,temperatureand
toxicitysensingwith additionalcapabilityfor smoke sensingand fire
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suppressionfor each isolatablecompartmentin the Space Stationwith primary
and back-upreadoutpanels locatedin separateSpace Stationareas. If
compartmentsize and criticalityso indicate,a need may exist for automatic
controlof hatch actuation. These design constraintsare dependentupon
assumedpenetrationsize, size of each isolatablevolume,use frequencyof the
compartmentand criticalityof the adjacentcompartments.
RADIATION
Radiationthreats are associatedwith the exposureof the astronautsas
well as equipmentto ionizingradiation,ultravioletor infraredlight,
lasers,and electromagneticor radio frequencyradiation. Ionizingradiation
threatsmay be caused by leakingor inadequatelyshieldedradioactive
equipmentsuch as RTG's, particleaccelerators,liquidmetal heat exchangers,
etc. RF and electromagneticradiationfrom RF generatorscan triggerordnance
devicesor interferewith the operationof criticalequipment. Allowable
levels of each of these energiesmust be established,and design accommodation
made to ensure that the Space Stationastronautsand equipmentare protected.
OUT OF CONTROL IVA/EVAASTRONAUT
Loss of controlof astronautsduring IVA/EVAmay be caused by
malfunctioningmaneuveringdevicesor lack of adequatehandholdsand other
restraints. The issue of aberrantastronautactionscausinga problemmust be
considered. Rapid rescue is requiredby a companionalreadysuited and
conditionedto the suit atmosphere,who is waiting in an airlockor is also
performingEVA or IVA. Equipmentadequacyand redundancycould addressthe
former issue,the lattermay requiresome physicalrestraintsystem,equipment
or facility.
INADVERTENTOPERATIONS
Criticaltasks and systemscontrolsshould be analyzedto assess the
impactof inadvertentoperations. Hardwarecan be protectedby switch
wickets,lever-locks,etc. Softwarecan be protectedby two or three
"and"-ingrequirements,as well as being protectedfrom astronautmodification
on-board. Recommendatonsare for automatingall routinefunctions,with
manual work-aroundsas required.
LACK OF CREW COORDINATION
Within the aviationindustry- both civilianand military- experience
has shown that lack of crew coordinationin times of crisis has almost
invariablyresultedin catastrophe. Some of the recentmajor disastersin
commercialair travel have occurredas a resultof the entire crews' attention
being divertedtotrouble shootingthe problemaffectingthe airplanewhile no
one paid attentionto the ordinarychores of pilotingand navigatingthe
airplane. One major airline radicallychangedcrew trainingand upgrading
techniquesto address this problem. Similarproblemsof lack of crew
coordinationcould arise in a Space Station. It is importantthat critical
routinefunctionsbe manned at all times, if not automated. This will allow
investigationof malfunctioningequipmentby personnelnot dedicatedto
routine,but essential,Space Stationequipment. Crew tasks should be
reviewedcarefullywith this potentialproblem in mind.
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ABANDONMENTOF SPACESTATION
There should be a passive capability of the Space Station to survive
abandonment. A combination of accidents and/or subsystems degradation
requiring the abandonment of the station by some or all of the occupying
personnel is considered here. Such abandonment will not be a time-critical
emergency but a deliberate abandonment planned over a period of days to
months. The worst design case is when one of the separate pressure volumes
has been evacuated and sealed off for some time because of major damage or
contamination, and all personnel are in the remaining volume. If the cause
for abandonment concerns the inability of the station to support human
habitation,the stationshouldbe able to maintaincriticalfunctions,such as
attitudemaintenance. A cause for abandonmentcould be loss of a breathable
atmosphere. Criticalavionicequipmentshould be able to functionin the
absenceof an atmosphere. An importanttask relatedto the above hazard, that
was consideredduringthis effortwas the Escape and Rescue. The philosophy
adoptedwith respectto escapeand rescueis statedbelow:
IncreasedReliability
or Redundancy Preventive Built-In
Damage Control
Compartmentalization Preventive Built-In
ImprovedEmergency
Sensors Preventive Built-In
On-BoardPreventive
Maintenance Preventive Built-In
Abort Capability Remedial Built-In
PersonalSurvival
Equipment Remedial Separate Built-In
On-BoardRepair
Capability Remedial Separate Built-In
On-BoardMedicalAid Remedial Separate Built-In
On-BoardEmergency
"RED" Systems Remedial Separate Built-In
"Buddy"Concept
(SeparateType) Remedial Separate
On-BoardEscapeand Wait Remedial Separate
On-BoardEscape and Return Remedial Separate
Spare Earth Return Module Remedial Separate
Unmanned/Manned
Assistance or Rescue
EarthLaunched
(Post Emergency) Remedial Separate
"Pre-Deployed" Remedial Separate
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ELECTRICALSHOCK
When personnel,duringthe normaloperationsof equipmentor due to
singlepoint failuresor masked dual point failures,are exposedto
electricallyenergizedcomponents,terminalstrips,buss bars, storedcharge
apparatus,etc., that througha combinationof electricalpotential,current
and body resistancewould allow a person'sbody to offer a path for current
flow to ground and result in shock or electrocution,a hazard potential
exists. A hazardousvoltageor power source is any potentialsource of power
that can produceseriousshock or burns or a fatal current,dependentupon body
resistance,contactconditions,and path throughthe body (seetable below).
Also equipmentwhich sensesor controlscriticalcontrolparametersof flight
systemsor is reasonablycapableof applyingdamagingelectricalenergy to
supportedsystems is classifiedas SafetyCritical.
PROBABLEEFFECTSOF SHOCK
CurrentValues (Milliamps)
AC 60HZ DC Effects
O-I 0-4 Perception
1-4 4-I5 Surprise
4-21" 15-80* Reflex Action
21-40* 80-I60* Muscular Inhibition
40-I00" 160-300" RespiratoryBlock
Over lO0* Over 300* UsuallyFatal
*SeriousShock or Burns.
METEOROIDPENETRATION
A falloutof space debris studieswill have to be a probabilityof strike
and an assumedsize of meteoroid. The potentialimpactof this threat has not
been specificallydefinedat this time. However,basic assumptionsshould
considerpotentialmeteoroidpenetrationof the primarystructure. Physical
damage should be confinedto one compartmentand is assumed to consist of
finely dividedmolten higil-speedshrapnel (fromspallationof the inner wall).
STORES/CONSUI4ABLESDEPLETION
Consumables,both for the Space Stationas well as for the astronauts,
requireestablishinglevels that accountfor leakage,spoilage,unexpected
high consumptionrates,etc. The key to establishingquantities,is
determiningwhat survivaltime, without supportfrom tileground is required:
96 hours, seven days, or what? Automaticinventoryingof criticalconsumables
should be considered.
INTRUSION/ATTACK
Screeningrelatedliteratureindicatesthat intra-crewmember hostility
was an issue on the longer space flights. When space stationsevolve and less
higillymotivatedand dedicatedpersonnelare includedin crews, special
screeningof candidateswill be required. This threatcould be psychological
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as well as physical. STS-5,and subsequentflightswhere more than two crew
membersare on board,will be watchedcloselyas crew interactionwill be more
complex. How to approachthe impactof this threat: with sedation,by
employing"PolarisPajamas",by isolatingoffendingcrew members,etc. - must
be determined. Overtmilitary actionand externalintrusion/attackis a
falloutof a space stationsurvivabilityanalysisand is beyond the scope of
this study.
STRUCTURALEROSION
This issue has been observedin long lived spacecraft. Space debrisand
otherminutia progressivelycan erode metallicor non-metallicenclosuresto
the point where leakagecould occur. If the eroded skins allow fluid or gas
containmentsystemsto leak, undesirablespin/tumblingmomentscould be
reactedinto the space stationand/orconsumablescould be lost overboard.
This is a downstream"wear"issue but appearsto be real enough to address in
the program.
ORBIT DECAY
Consumablesneeded to update orbitalpositionor to overcomethe effects
of space stationdrag may becomean issuewhen largecaptive structuresare
being constructedprior to separationfrom the space station. Credibilityof
this threat is understoodwhen one considersa fullyoperationalspace station
in its plannedworkingenvironment. This threat impactsconsumablemargins.
LOSS OF ACCESS TO A HATCH
The loss of accessto any one hatch, door, or other personnelor cargo
transferopeningbecauseof jammingof the mechanism,eitheropen or closed;
or becauseof obstructionby cargo;or becauseof a localizedhazardous
situation(fire,chemicalspillage,electricalhazard,etc.).
Compartmentationto allow accessto "safe havens"requiresa minimum of two
egress paths from each habitablevolume. Presentspace stationdesign
philosophyappearsto providethis capability. Designdriversare hazards
that destroycompartmenthabitabilityand requiresurvivalworkarounds.
TEMPERATUREEXTREMES
Abilityof crew and equipmentto functionunder varyingtemperature
stressesneeds to be considered. Emergenciessuch as the Apollo 13 Service
Module tank explosion,may be postulatedto determinethe credibilityof this
threat. Unexpectedheat inputs from experiments/payloads/cargoneed be
addressedearly to ensurethe space station'sabilityto grow into its
operationalphase. This threatdeals indirectlywith plannedEC margins and
absolutecapabilities.
DEBRIS
The threatcategoryof externaldebris includesobjectsin excess of
meteoroidsin size, usuallyreferredto as space garbage. Nominally,space
debris,as opposed to meteoroids,would have lower closurerates allowingthe
possibleoptionof collisionavoidance. Internaldebris,on the other hand,
can clog filtersand directlyaffectequipmentoperationand crew
performance. The Orbiterhas experiencedclogged filtersdue to lint,
affectingair cooled avionicsand overloadingfan motors.
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AppendixBC
SPACE STATION
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA
These criteriawere eclecticallyassembledfrom
industryspace stationstudiesbeginningas early as
1968. Those criteriathat were relevantto the
current space stationstudieswere carried fon_ard,
if not in detail,at least in intent. Reassessment
of threatsunder ContractNASl-17242evolved
additionalcriteriathat are included.
20 January 1984
RockwellInternational
Space Transportationand
SystemsGroup
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SPACE STATION Rev. December15, 1983
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA
DAMAGETOLERANCE
A-l No crediblesinglespace stationfailure,operationalerror or radio
frequencysignalshould result in damage to space stationor mission/
payloadequipmentor in the use of emergencyequipment;some limited
degradationin mission/payloadaccommodations,crew convenience/
comfort,or space stationattitudeor orbitmay be allowed
A-2 No crediblecombinationof two space stationfailures,
mission/payloadequipmentfailures,operatorerrors,or radio
frequencysignalsshouldresult in the potentialfor crew injuryor
permanentloss of the space stationor primarymission/payload
capability;institutionof emergencyprocedure/equipmentmay be
necessarybut no hazardousoperationallevel will be reached
A-3 All subsystem/equipmentcriticalto preservationof life and space
stationsurvivalshall be fail-operational/fail-safe( xcepting
primarystructureand pressurevessels)
A-4 Fail-operational/fail-safed signedsubsystemsshouldallow
maintenanceto upgradethe subsystem/equipmentwithoutbeing degraded
below fail-safeduring the maintenanceactionsfollowingthe second
failure
A-5 Potentiallyrupturablecontainersshouldcontainless material (gas,
liquid,solid) than would cause unacceptableoverpressureif all the
materialwere releasedin a leakage,ruptureor explosion
A-6 Redundantaccommodationsfor commandand controlof the space station
shall be providedsuch that the primarycontrolcenter has complete
capability,but the backupcontrolcenterwill have, as a minimum,
controlof criticalfunctions
A-7 Design inhibitsto preventfailurepropagationfrom one
volume/subsystem/componentto anothershouldbe incorporated
A-8 The space stationshould be designedand operatedso that any damaged
module can be isolatedfrom the rest of the Stationin TBD seconds,
as required. Provisionsshall be made for pressureisolationwithin
the volumes. 14oduleshould be equippedand provisionedso that the
crew can safelycontinuea degradedmission and take corrective
actionto either repairor replacethe damagedmodule
A-9 Any volume shouldbe capableof sustainingthe whole crew, and
capabilityshouldbeprovided for performingcriticalfunctionsat an
emergencylevel until the crew can be rescued. Electricaland fluid
lines in each pressure-isolatablevolumerequiredfor critical
functionsshouldbe protectedagainstthe effectsof explosion,fire,
vacuum,and corrosion
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A-10 Capability should be provided for performing critical functions with
a portion of a subsystem inoperative for maintenance, and any
pressure-isolatable volume inactivated and not accessible
A-II Redundant equipment, lines, cables, and utility runs which are
critical for safety of personnel or mission continuation should
either be located and routed in separate compartments (i.e.,
separated by a structural wall) or should be protected against fire,
smoke, contamination, loss of pressure, overpressure, and shrapnel
A-12 All walls, bulkheads, hatches and seals whose integrity is required
to maintain pressurization or atmospheric isolation shall be readily
accessible for inspection and repair by crewmen in pressurized suits
A-13 As a design goal, inspection, maintenance and repair of critical
subsystems by shirt-sleeved crewmembers shall be accommodated.
CREWPROTECTION
B-I Provisions should be made for a safe haven within the space station,
isolatable from the hazard capable of sustaining the crew for 21 days
beyond normal resupply and allowing rescue by a Shuttle. Provisions
shall be made to monitor the health of the remaining habitable
modules from this safe haven
B-2 Personnel protection from electrical shock, radiation, mechanical and
thermal hazards should be provided
B-3 Accessways between compartments should be sized such that an IVA/EVA-
suited crewman is allowed free passage
B-4 Provisions shall be made for the protection and survival of the whole
crew during solar storm activity as defined by the TBD design mission
radiation model
B-5 Personnel escape routes should be provided in all hazardous situations
B-6 Provisions and habitable facilities should be adequate to sustain the
entire crew for a minimum of 22 days during an emergency situation
when damagerepair is in progress
B-7 Atmospheric stores and subsystem capability sufficient for two full
repressurizations of each pressurized habitable volume should be
maintained on/at the space station during manned operations
B-8 Access to EVA and IVA airlock and suit station(s) should be provided
for all credible emergency conditions. Airlock chamber(s) should be
provided to permit crew access for EVA/IVA operations
B-9 Two or more suited crewmen should participate in any pressure suit
activity and rescue provisions should be provided to allow safe
return to space station, following the incapacitation of any one
crewman
B-IO Real-time monitoring of the atmosphere constituents, including
harmful airborne trace contaminants and odors should be performed.
Control shall be provided for each pressurized habitable volume
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B-11 Two or more entry/egresspaths should be providedto and from every
module or pressure-isolatablevolume. The two paths shouldbe
separatedby airtightpartitions,or shall be at least lO feet apart,
and shouldeach lead to an area in which the crew can surviveuntil
escape, rescueor removalof the hazard
B-12 Materialsused in the habitableareas shouldnot outgass toxic
constituentsin the lowest pressureenvironmentand highest
temperatureto which they will be exposed
B-13 All EVA and unpressurizedcompartmentIVA shouldbe conductedusing
the "buddysystem". (Note: buddy systemcriteriacan be met with
suitedcrew to stationexit in visualcontactwith subject.) The
buddy system shouldalso be used during shirtsleeveoperationsin
hazardousareas
B-14 A margin of consumablesshouldbe providedonboard,sufficientfor
performingcriticalfunctionsfor TBD hours at a reducedlevel
followingany credibleaccidentwhich rendersone pressure-isolatable
compartmentunavailable
B-15 At least two egress paths should be availablefrom each module for
emergencyegressof personnelduringmanned groundoperations
B-16 Emergencypressuresuits requiredin the space station,sized to fit
any crewman,should be in readilyaccessiblelocationswithin each
pressure-isolatable volume
B-17 Provisionsshould be made for emergencymedicaltreatmentof credible
accidentsand illnessesfor durationscompatiblewith the rescue
provisions
B-18 Tilesafe environmentand the safe operationalstatusof activated
subsystemswithin the space stationshouldbe verifiedprior to
personnelentry, initiallyand prior to reentryfollowingtemporary
stationabandonment
B-19 Deploymentand initiationof operationsconsideredhazardousshould
be checkedout from a safe locationbeforeexposingcrewmento the
potentialhazards
B-20 Provisionshould be made for the returnof a cre_._anincapacitated
while performingEVA
B-21 Provisionsshouldbe made for the detection,handling,containment
and/or disposalof toxic, flammable,combustibleand hazardous
materials
B-22 Pressurizedvolumesshould have adequatefree volume (not occupiedby
equipment)to allow crew freedomof movement to supportlong-duration
habitation
B-23 Hazardousor toxic fluid storage,conduitsand interconnectsbetween
modules shouldbe externalto the pressurizedvolume. Exceptionsmay
be made for flammablebut nontoxicgases where the maximum possible
quantityreleasedby a leak cannot result in a flammablemixture
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B-24 Provisionsshould be made for detectionand controlof pathogenic
agentsonboard the space stationusing methods harmlessto crew and
equipment
B-25 Plannedcrew tasks shouldbe assessedinitially,for compliance
intentwith TBD regulationsbefore performingsuch tasks; and crew
trainingprovidedfor each specializedand/orhazardoustask
B-26 Provisionshouldbe made for handlingirrationalcre_membersand the
remainsof deceasedcrewmembers
B-27 The occupiedcompartment'sacousticalnoise environmentshould be
within human tolerancenoise exposurelimitations,permit
intelligibleauditorycommunications,have a minimumof pure tone or
narrow frequencyband(s),a minimumof intermittentor discontinuous
noisesand a minimum of high-frequencynoises. Systemand equipment
design (includingsubcontractors)shouldbe accomplishedfrom the
outsetto producean acceptablenoise environment. Desirably,the
noise environmentshouldmeet NC TBD-or-lowernoise contour for work
periodsand NC TBD-or-lowerfor sleep periods
B-28 Any module designatedas a safe haven shall be providedwith an
airlockchamberat the port assignedfor orbiter dockingand rescue,
to allow crew transferand rescue from a degradedand/ormarginal
safe haven. The rescuehatch shall providefor actuationfrom inside
or outsideto accommodatecontingencies
B-29 Subsystemsshall be designedto preventinadvertentor accidental
activationor deactivationof functionsor equipmentthat would be
hazardousto personnelor the Space Station
B-30 Radiationdoses that affectpersonnelsafetymust be consideredfrom
all sources,includingnaturalenvironment,externalisotopeand
reactorsources (if any), electromagnetic,solar radiationand
internallyallowableradiationlevels from experiments,processesand
healthmaintenance/diagnosticequipment
B-31 Exposedsurfaceswithin habitablemodules shall not exceed a
temperatureof ll3°F (witha design goal of lOS°F)and a low
temperatureof no less than 40°F
B-32 Except for contingenciesEVA shall not be used for hazardous
operationsor when a maneuveringspacecraftis within the proximity
operatingzone (+5 nm)
STATION INTEGRITY
C-l Primarypressurestructuralmaterialsshouldbe nonflammable.
Interiorwalls and secondarystructureshouldbe self-extinguishing
C-2 Normallyexposed nonmetallicmaterialsshouldbe self-extinguishing
in the most severeoxidizingenvironmentto which they will be
exposed. Means shall be providedfor fireproofstorageof medical
supplies,maintenancesupplies,food, tissue,clothing,trash, and
for other non-self-extinguishingitems,when they are not in use
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C-3 Potentiallyexplosivecontainerssuch as high pressurevesselsor
volatilegas storagecontainersshall be placed outsideof and as
remotelyas possiblefrom personnellivingand operatingquarters.
Whereverpossiblethe containersshouldbe isolatedand protectedso
that failureof one will not propagateto others
C-4 Containmentof all materialsrequiringreturn via the STS to prevent
contaminationof the space stationenvironmentshouldbe providedto
reduce the hazardof potentialfire and toxic conditions
C-5 Tank supportsshouldbe designedto restrainthe tank under
propulsiveeffect of rapidlyescapinggas
C-6 Design provisionsshouldbe incorporatedto preventuncontrollable
hatch opening due to pressuredifferentials,and to allow controlled
closingof hatch openingswith or againstpressuredifferentials,for
the worst care pressuredifferentialsanticipated
C-7 Equipmentor materialssensitiveto contaminationshould be handled
in a controlledenvironment. Fluidsand materialsshouldbe
compatiblewith the combinedenvironmentin which they are employed
C-8 Provisionsshould be made to allow communicationbetweenany and all
isolatable/habitablevolumeson a primaryand backupbasis
C-9 Provisionsshould be made for materialusage, identificationand
locationmapping to allow real-timeevaluationto determineadequate
inspection/maintenancereplacementfrequencies
C-lO Fluid or gaseousflow such as pressurerelief valves/exhausts,fuel
transferdisconnects,etc., shouldbe designedto preventtorquing/
turningor undesirabletranslationmotions to the space station
C-ll All reactioncontrolthrustingdevicesused primarilyfor altitude
positioningof the space station,and occasionallyfor velocity
changes,shouldbe locatedsuch that the exhaustplume does not
impingeupon other structuralelementssuch as solarcells, areas
requiringEVA maintenanceor other vehiclesdockingwith the space
station
C-12 Space stationmodules should be tumbledto rid them of internal
debris and contaminantsimmediatelyprior to preparationfor launch
C-13 Provisionsshall be made for in-flightservicing,adjusting,
cleaning,removaland replacementof offendingcomponents,testing
and repairingof all criticalsubsystems
C-14 Wear items shouldbe life cycle tested in a realisticenvironment
C-15 All personalitems shouldbe screenedfor flammabilityand toxicity
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C-16 Space Stationprotectiveenclosuresshall be providedfor all high
mass/highspeed rotatingmachinery
C-17 Active/passivecompartmentationshouldbe providedto contain and/or
preventfire/explosion/depressurizationinitiationor impact
propagation. Compartmentsshould be inspectableto supportdamage
controland maintenanceoperations.
CONTINGENCYCONTROL
D-l Identifiedhazardsshould be eliminated,reducedto controlled
hazards,or specifiedas residualhazards
D-2 Provisionshouldbe made for detecting,annunciating,containing/
confirming,controllingand restoringto a safe conditionemergencies
such as fire, toxic contamination,depressurization,structural
damage,etc. The tools, tasks, spares,workspace,storagevolumes
necessaryfor these provisionsshall be includedin space station
design planning
D-3 For thosemalfunctionsand/orhazardswhich may result in time-
criticalemergencies,provisionshould be made for the automatic
switchingto a safe mode of operationand for cautionand warning of
personnel
D-4 The capabilityshouldbe providedon the space stationfor the
detectionof malfunctionsand/orhazards,tracingto the failed
replaceableunit and the displayof informationto the crew necessary
for correctiveaction
D-5 Provisionsshould be made for the crew to ascertainthe hazard status
of any habitablemodule externalto the inhabitedmodule and to
mitigateor control remotelythose hazardswhich would precludesafe
entryto the module in question
D-6 The crew must be able to overrideany automaticsafingor switchover
capability. All overridesshould be two-stepoperationswith
positivefeedbackto the initiator,which reportimpendingresultsof
the overridecommand,prior to the acceptanceof an executecommand
D-7 Windows shouldbe providedin the space stationto enableadequate
visibilityto accomplishsafe dockingoperationswith the orbiter or
other vehicles. Additionalwindowswill be necessaryto monitor EVA
operations,logisticresupplyoperationsand to supportphotographic
requirements. Transmissionthroughthe windows shouldbe such as to
protectthe crew from harmfulUV and IR radiation. Thermalflux from
the windows shouldbe controlledto preventexcessiveheat from the
crewman'sface and head
D-8 An independentself-containedilluminationsystem shouldbe provided
that will be automaticallyactivatedin the event of a major primary
power failureor main lightingcircuitmalfunctionresultingin
circuit breaker interruption
D-9 Materialsand componentssubjectto insidiousdegradationin the
Space Station ionizingradiationenvironmentshall not be used where
that degradationcan cause or contributeto a crew hazard
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D-lO Provisionsshall be made for safe disposalof the Space Stationor
any auxiliarypart thereofwithoutdanger to flightor groundcrew-
membersor the public
SELECTION/INDOCTRINATION
E-l Crew selectionshouldbe based on selecteescross-trainabilityin
fields other than speciality
E-2 Orbitalcrews shouldbe an integralpart of the air/groundsystem
active interfacewith on-orbitcrews
.E-3 Stationcrews and teamingshould allowequal thirdsof schedulefor
on-orbit,ground interfaceoperationand recycleoperations.(post
orbit rehabilitation,leave,additionaltraining,public relations,
etc.)
E-4 Assuranceshouldbe providedthat each missionsegmentcrew is
familiarwith l) StationOperationsand Maintenanceas concerns
criticalsubsystemand 2) Proceduresnecessaryto renderSAFE all
experimentsand/or user-processes
E-5 Screeningcriteriashouldincludeassessmentof attitudes,physical
needs, psychologicalneeds, personalitytraits,abilityto function
under stress,abilityto accept direction,and TBD
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AppendixBD
SPACE STATION
CREW SAFETYDESIGN GUIDELINES
These design guidelineswere eclecticallyassembled
from industry space station studies beginning as
early as 1968. Those guidelinesthat were relevant
to the current space station studies were carried
forward, if not in detail, at least in intent.
Reassessmentof threats under Contract NASI-17242
evolvedadditionalguidelinesthat are included.
21 February1984
RockwellInternational
Space Transportationand
SystemsGroup
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SPACESTATIONSAFETYGUIDELINES
Design Guidelines Acronyms
AOM = Attitude/OrbitMaintenanceSystems
C&W = Cautionand WarningSystems
CME = Crew MessingEquipment
COM = CommunicationEquipment
CPH = Cargo/PayloadHandlingSystems
CSE = Crew Safety Equipment
CWS = Crew Water Systems
DPS = Data ProcessingSystems
DUS = Docking/UndockingSystems
ECS = EnvironmentControlSystem
EPD = ElectricalPower DistributionSystems
EPG = ElectricalPower GeneratingEquipment
FSE = Fluid SystemEquipment
HMS = HealthMaintenanceSystems
IFM = In-FlightMaintenance
INT = Integration,two or more systemsinvolved
MSE = MechanicalSystemsEquipment
NUC = Nuclear/IonizingRadiationSystemsEquipment
OPS = Operations
RSD = RadiationShieldingDevices
STR = StructuralSystems
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SPACE STATIONCANDIDATESAFETY DESIGt_GUIDELINES
DG-INT-OOI. Normallyhabitablecompartmentsof more than 25 cubic meters
(880 cubic feet) in volume shall have two or more exits into areas which
rovide for personnel survival. These exits shall be at least 3 meters
lO feet) apart.
DG-INT-O02. Flammable, explosive or gas generating material shall be
located so that the energy contentwhich can be propagatedat any one location
shall not result in overpressurizationof the compartmentfrom heat and gas
production.
DG-INT-O03. Flammable, explosive or gas generating material within
3 meters (lO feet) of the entrance to compartmentswith only one entry/egress
path shall be limited so that the energy content,if released,will not result
in damage or an environment which prevents shirtsleeve access through the
entrance.
DG-INT-O04. Two or more entrances into normally habitable compartments
of more than 25 cubic meters (880 cubic feet) in volume shall be shirtsleeve
accessible from each of the other normally inhabited compartments. These
entrancesshall be at least 3 meters (lO feet) apart.
DG-INT-O05. Where only one shirtsleeveingress/egresspath is provided
into a compartmentor module, redundantmeans shall be available for opening
the connectinghatch(es)from eitherside.
DG-INT-O06. Capability shall be provided to depressurize adjacent
volumesbefore undocking.
DG-ECS-O07. Capabilityshall be provided to reduce the pressure in each
habitable volume sufficiently, or increase it in the adjoining habitable
volumesand to cut off air circulation,so that in an emergencythe atmosphere
in the affected volume will not be propagated into adjoining compartments.
This capabilityshall be controlledremotelyfrom each compartment.
DG-ECS-O08. Automatic venting capability shall be provided in each
habitablevolumeso that in the event of a fire or releaseof gases within the
volume the pressurewill not exceed the structurallimits of the structureor
the capability of the seals to other volumes to exclude the contaminated
atmosphere.
DG-INT-O09. Double contained toxic flammable or corrosive fluid
containers shall be provided, with means to detect leakage of the toxic
flammableor corrosive fluid into the volume in between the containers,and
with means to detect penetrationof the outsidecontainer.
DG-INT-OIO. Capability shall be provided to detect potential tank
failures by measurement of fluid pressures, temperatures,tank strains, or
other means.
DG-INT-OII. The reflectanceof surfaces of docking vehicles and the
docking system that are visible to the controllingcrew and TV cameras shall
be below eye and vidicondamage levels.
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DG-DUS-OI2. The vidicon tubes for docking shall be designed for low
sensitivityto tube image burn.
DG-DUS-OI3. Redundant or replaceable lighting provisions shall be
providedfor docking.
DG-DUS-OI4. Redundantor replaceablevidicontubes shall be provided for
docking.
DG-DUS-OI5. Redundantor replaceablevideomonitors shall be provided.
DG-DUS-OI6. Docking system rapid emergency release capability shall be
provided.
DG-DUS-OI7. The docking system shall be designed to withstand normal
jackknifing vehicle dynamics and will limit attitude excursions to within
prescribed limits as determined by space station geometry to prevent
inadvertentcontactfrom the dockingvehicle.
DG-DUS-OI8. The docking system shall be capable of withstandingvehicle
oscillations and loads generated by inadvertent attitude control system
activity of either or both vehiclesduring draw down to rigidize the capture
interface.
DG-INT-OIg. Thermal protection shall be provided to prevent jet plume
impingement damage to the space station from docking vehicles within the
designangular and linearmisalignments.
DG-IFM-020. Capabilityshall be provided to recycle both capture and
seal latcheson the dockingsystem from any phase of their status.
DG-INT-021. All hardware in the dockingtunnel will be flush mounted to
interiorwalls of the cargo/crewtransfertunnel.
DG-MSE-022. Stops shall be provided on hatches to prevent uncontrolled
opening if openedwhen a pressuredifferentialexists.
DG-DUS-023. All dockinginterfaceequipmentshall be grounded.
DG-DUS-024. At the docking ports, all electrical umbilicals shall be
groundeduntil connectionof the dockinginterface.
DG-INT-025. Capabilityshall be provided for the emergency shirtsleeve
survival of all on-board personnel until the next resupply or emergency
shuttleflight followingthe loss of access to any one module/compartment.A
shirtsleeveaccessibledocking port shall be available. If the loss of the
habitablevolume dividesthe space station into two or more isolatedhabitable
sections, then each section shall provide the survival capability for all
on-boardpersonnel,includingan availabledockingport.
DG-INT-026. A backup EVA egress/ingresshatch which can be used for
contingency EVA shall be available. Capability for depressurizationand
repressurizationof the connectinghabitablevolume shall be provided.
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DG-INT-027. An emergency IVA or EVA return route shall be availablefor
any planned IVA activity independent of the normal IVA airlock route.
Depressurizationand repressurizationcapability shall be provided for the
additionalvolumeswhich must be used.
DG-CSE-028. Emergencyportable life support systems shall be available
in the airlock sufficientto sustain IVA personnelin an emergency IVA or EVA
returnfrom planned IVA or EVA activity.
DG-C01_-029. Communication between any and all habitable/isolatable
volumeson a primaryand backup basis shall be provided.
DG-EPG-030. Adequate venting of batteries shall be provided to prevent
contamination,overpressureor explosion.
DG-FSE-031. All filters, screens or other devices used to collect
contaminants or waste products shall be designed so they can be easily
servicedor replacedwithout releasingcontaminantsinto the atmosphere.
DG-C&W-032. An audible and visual alarm shall be provided to warn the
crew of habitablevolume C02 partial pressurenot within the prescribedlimits
for crew safety. This alarm shall be providedboth in the affected habitable
volumesand at the commandand controlcenter(s).
DG-EPD-033. Equipment, including electricalwiring, that could become
contaminatedor damaged by leaking propellantsshall be located to prevent
contactwith possibleleakage or shall be providedwith suitableprotection.
DG-INT-034. 14eansshall be providedfor collectingand/or containingai_
loose fluidsor debris that may result duringreplacementof systemconponents.
DG-FSE-035. Fluid systems shall have provisions for shutting off the
flow of fluid to sectionsof the system or equipmentwhich are susceptibleto
damage or leakage.
DG-FSE-036. All orifices, close tolerance valves and
contamination-sensitiveequipment in fluid systems, shall be adequately
protected from contamination. Futhermore, if the system is designed for
periodic flow reversal,or a possibilityexists that flow reversalcan occur,
both sides of these items shall be protected.
DG-CME-037. Food supplies shall be stored in more than one storage
container.
DG-CME-038. A means for sterilizing containers where food is stored
shall be provided.
DG-CME-039. Food supplies which require cooling or refrigerationshall
be protectedby a redundantcapability.
DG-HMS-040. Means for controllinginsects in the space station shall be
provided. The controlmethod should be harmlessto men and equipment.
DG-INT-041. The use of mercury on-board space stations should be
prohibited.
89
DG-ECS-042. Provision shall be made for the removal of ozone generated
by X-ray equipmentor electricalarcs.
DG-FSE-043. The number of connectors used to connect plumbing or
componentsin fluid systemsshould be kept to a minimum.
DG-FSE-044. Safety requirementsfor all subsystems/experiments/internal
payloadsare needed.
DG-FSE-045. Fluids required for operation of subsystems located in
habitablevolumesshall be non-toxic,non-flammable,and non-corrosive.
DG-INT-046. Pressurizedcontainers should not be installed in normally
habitablevolumes. When installedexternally to normally habitable volumes,
shrapnelshieldsshall be providedto protectthe normallyhabitablevolumes.
DG-C&W-047. Visual and audible alarm shall be provided to warn the crew
of atmosphere contaminationwhich exceeds the limits established for crew
safety. This alarm shall be providedat a minimum in the affected habitable
volume and at the commandand controlcenter(s).
DG-C&W-048. Where the possibilityexists that a fluid in a system could
become contaminated,means shall be provided to detect contamination and
providean alarm at the commandand controlcenter(s).
DG-C&W-049. A system shall be provided to monitor the environmental
status of all potentially hazardous (explosive, flammable, toxic, etc.)
materials stored on-board the space station,and display a warning signal in
the commandand controlcenter(s)when establishedlimits are exceeded.
DG-C&W-050. A warning and alarm system shall be provided to alert the
crew of atmosphere relative humidity levels which are not within prescribed
limits,with the warning displayedat the commandand controlcenter(s).
DG-ECS-051. Provisions shall be made for containing, venting or
eliminatingodors and bacteriageneratedby waste productsand other sources.
DG-ECS-052. The composition of the space station water supply shall be
checked at regular intervals to ensure that contaminationdoes not exceed
prescribedlimits.
DG-CWS-053. A capabilityshall be providedfor maintainingthe sterility
of on-boardwater supplies.
DG-CWS-054. Water storage systems shall have provisions for isolating
parts of the systemwhich may have becomecontaminated.
DG-CWS-055. Water supplies shall be stored in areas which will minimize
the possibilityof contaminationfrom other space stationsystems.
DG-INT-056. System components shall be designed to withstand the
overpressureand heat pulse attendantto meteroidpenetration.
DG-ECS-057. Materials used for insulation or filler in space station
walls shall be non-combustible.
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DG-IFM-058. Windows shall be designed to permit replacement without
degrading the pressure or structural integrity of the space station.
DG-STR-059. Individual habitable volumes shall be designed to withstand
a rapid decompression of any adjacent compartment.
DG-STR-060. Space station structure shall be designed as a structural
matrix with the capability of arresting crack and tear growth.
DG-INT-061. Equipment located in habitable volumes shall be designed to
create no hazard to occupants during the changing environment associated with
rapid decompression of the space station.
DG-MSE-062. Automatic closure of hatches between habitable volumes, when
pressure decreases below a specified limit, should _be considered as a designfeature.
DG-OPS-063. Hatches between compartments should be closed except when
required for crew transit.
DG-C&W-064. A means shall be provided for visual inspection of the hatch
as well as the warning system, as a safety check to assure that hatches or
other accesses to an area at a different pressure level have been secured
properly. Warning system displays shall be at the hatch and at the command
and control center(s)..
DG-MSE-065. Pressure hatches providing access to an area of differential
pressure should be of a type that becomes more positively engaged under
pressure loading.
DG-ECS-066. Hatch design should be such that loss of a hatch seal
element will not result in a pressure leakage rate which exceeds the emergency
recompressionsystemcapability.
DG-INT-067. Provision should be made for an airlock in the hatch or
hatchwaybetweenseparatelypressurizablecompartments.
DG-INT-068. A leakage repair system employing techniquesand equipment
appropriateto the vacuum and gravity environmentof the space station shall
be providedas a kitablepart of the damagecontrol system.
DG-HMS-069. Considerationshould be given to providingthe equipmentand
supplies necessary for general cardiopulmonary resuscitation and other
equipmentand suppliesthat might be requiredfor the individualizedtreatment
of residualeffectsof decompression.
DG-FSE-070. All pressure relief valves shall be designed to protect
againsta regulatorfailed or stuck in the full open position.
DG-FSE-071. Plumbing systems which carry cryogenic fluids or hydrogen
peroxide should be designed such that adequate pressure relief capability
exists in those areas most likely to trap the fluids. Furthermore,to guard
against the possibilitythat a relief valve in these systems becomes frozen
shut or otherwiserendered inoperative,a backup pressurerelief device, such
as burstdisks, shouldbe incorporated.
91
DG-INT-072. All pressure systems should be designedto enable a planned
depressurization;accurate sensors should be incorporatedto ensure that the
pressure is totally relieved prior to opening the system should that
requirementarise for maintenanceor other reasons.
DG-ECS-073. Any pressurizablevolume than can be confinedor isolatedby
any means, such as by valves, should include some means for automatic
protectionfrom overpressure.
DG-FSE-074. Pressurizedgas supplies should include restrictionsthat
will limit gas flow in the event of a pressurizedgas plumbing failure, to
that which can be handledby the relief valvesor venting system.
DG-IFM-075. Design of space station structureand equipment, including
their interfaces,should be such that all portions of the pressure shell,
bulkheadsand seals will be accessiblefor damage inspectionand repair. This
shouldapply to exterioras well as interiorspace stationsurfaces.
DG-INT-076. Potentiallyharmful effects on the crew members of rapid
decompression should be minimized through engineering considerations in
selection of space station atmosphere composition, pressure and habitable
compartmentnet volume.
DG-STR-077. The space station shall be of sufficientstructuralstrength
to safely maintain the required internalpressure within tileexpected launch
and mission environmentfor the period of orbital stay.
DG-IFM-078. Components which are vented to space (vacuum) shall be
replaceablewithout requiringcabin depressurization.
DG-IFM-079. Cabin pressure shall not be vented to space through
compartmentsor outlets that are used to vent fluids.
DG-ECS-080. Pressurerelief devices for all pressurizedvolumes shall be
vented to areas that will not endangerthe crew or equipment.
DG-ECS-O8I. All cabin atmosphereoverboardrelief or "dump" valves (any
valve venting into space) shall be fail-safein the closed positionand should
be self-indicatingwhen failed. Manual overrideor redundantmanual valving
shouldbe providedas backup.
DG-C&W-082. Total cabin pressure sensors shall be provided to detect
out-of-tolerancevalues of the total cabin pressure. Detection of pressure
change at an excessive rate, or outside the desired operating range, should
activate an alarm system to warn the crew to initiate appropriateremedial
action. The alarm should be activated both in the affected habitablevolume
and at the commandand controlcenter(s).
DG-C&W-083. All pressure warning systems shall include provisions for
self-testand shall be self-indicatingin the failed state.
DG-EPD-084. Wire bundles shall be routed and protected as to preclude
damageto the insulationthroughflexingor bumping.
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DG-EPD-085. Suitablepositive means, such as keying, shall be provided
to preclude accidental mismating of electrical connectors. This _vouldbe
especially significant for connectors which are to be connected and
disconnectedduringorbitaloperations(e.g.,experiments).
DG-EPD-086. Considerationshould be given to the design of electrical
subsystem components (e.g., wall switches, light bulbs, or hot plates) to
protect them from wear-out or inadvertentbreakage, which could result in
generatingshortsor arcing.
DG-INT-087. Enclosedair duct systems that includepotential sources of
atmospherecontaminationshould provide sensors immediatelydownstreamof the
contaminationsource,which, if activated,would shut off the airflow through
this equipment and provide a visual and audible alarm at the command and
controlcenter(s).
DG-ECS-088. Active redundancyshould be provided for equipmentwhich is
essentialto the controland detectionof atmospherecontaminants.
DG-EPD-089. All temporary electrical connections (outlets,connectors,
etc.) shall be so designed and/or operated as to eliminatethe possibilityof
arcing.
DG-EPD-090. Wire bundles should not be located near potential heat
sources,includingthose areas where potentialfor fire exists.
DG-EPD-091. Provisionsshouldbe made to ensure proper pin connectionat
all critical electricalconnectorsprior to the applicationof system power.
Verification should be made to ensure that all pin connections exist as
designed,no pin-to-pinshortsexist, and that no pin-to-shellshortsexist.
DG-INT-092. All equipment and substructureshall be grounded to the
basic space station.
DG-INT-093. A means should be provided to equalize electric potential
differencesbetweendockingspacecraft.
DG-EPD-094. Multiple power distributionpaths to essential electrical
equipmentshouldbe provided.
DG-C&W-095. Sensors shall be provided to detect out-of-tolerancevalues
for critical electricalpower source parameters,such as voltage, frequency,
current,temperature,etc., or momentaryexcessivepower surges resultingfrom
equipmentturn-onor turn-off. The sensorsshould activatean alarm system at
the commandand controlcenter(s)of deviationsfrom the desiredparameters.
DG-EPG-096. Multipleor redundantprimaryelectricalpower sources shall
be provided such that a single failure will not result in a complete loss of
primary electricalpower, or cause failure of equipment which is unable to
survivemomentarypower interruption.
DG-EPD-097. Protectivecovers shall be provided for all portionsof the
electrical subsystem to which access is required (switch boards, terminal
boards,etc.).
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DG-EPD-098. Redundant electricalcircuits for items critical to crew
safetysilouldnot be includedin the same wire bundle.
DG-EPD-099. Power distributionlines should be routed in such a manner
that any damage resulting from fire, caused by a fault in the distribution
system, will have a minimal effect on other power distributionwires in the
vicinity.
DG-OPS-IO0. Proceduresshould be establishedand means providedthe crew
for controllingand/or eliminatingcontaminationthat is in excess of the ECS
capabilityto controlon a timely basis.
DG-ECS-IOI. Redundant C02 removal equipment with capability of manual
override of automatic operation should be provided to ensure a continuous
capabilityto keep the C02 partialpressurewithin allowablelimits.
DG-ECS-I02. The amount of toxic or potentiallytoxic materials (such as
materials or chemicals utilized in experiments)on-board the space station
should be limited such that accidentalrelease of the total quantity of the
material will not produce contamination above the capability of the
environmentalcontrolsystem to remove on a timelybasis.
DG-HMS-103. ThresholdLimit Values (TLV's)of contaminantsfor long term
human exposureshould be establishedfor space stationenvironments.
DG-OPS-I04. Strict configuration control procedures should be
established over all materials incorporated in or brought on-board the
spacecraft.
DG-OPS-I05. The original orbital flight path selection and changes
required by station-keepingduring the mission should be such that the
probability of collision with man-made debris or other spacecraft is
sufficientlylow to provide adequateconfidencein orbit selectionand program
decisionto proceed.
DG-CPH-I06. All bulk cargo should be properly tethered or otherwise
controlledduring zero-gravityor partialgravityoperations.
DG-OPS-I07. Procedures and equipment should be available for use in
event of death of a crew member.
DG-HMS-I08. Procedures and equipment should be provided for the
preservationor disposal of the remains of deceased experimentalplants or
animals.
DG-OPS-I09. The program of selection, training, mission support,
physical conditioning,daily activities,and recreation should insure that
crew members remain confidentin the missionand their roles in it.
DG-HMS-IIO. Proceduresand equipment should be provided for restraint
and controlof irrationalcrew members.
DG-HMS-III. Unauthorized personnel should be restricted from using
radiation-producingequipment or handling and using on-board radioisotopes.
Consider the installationof appropriatecaution signs and/or other means of
warning, featuringvisibleor audiblesignals.
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DG-HMS-II2. Safe procedures should be established for the disposal of
radioactivewaste or radiation-contaminatedmaterial. The procedures should
also include the actions necessary for the disposal of a spent or failed
nuclearpower reactor.
DG-HMS-II3. On-board handling and use of radioactive material or
radiation-producingequipmentshould conformor be consistentwith established
NASA and Nuclear Regulatory Commission policy and procedures for radiation
protectionstandards.
DG-HMS-II4. Positive protectivemeasures should be taken to prevent
accidentalexposureto personnelfrom RF or X-radiation.
DG-EPG-IIS. Nuclear powered electricalpower sources should be located
and shielded to protect crew members from accumulatingexcessive radiation
dosage.
DG-HMS-II6. Crew location during the nuclear power unit activation
should be restricted to refuge areas affording high protective shielding,
until radiation levels have been checked in all habitable areas within the
space stationand have been found to be within acceptablelimits.
DG-NUC-II7. Space station installed/residingactive nuclear reactor
shall provide fail-operational/fail-safem asures for emergency shutdown of a
reactor and provide alternatemethods of reactor heat dissipationin event of
failureof the primarycooling system.
DG-RSD-II8. The space station radiationprotectionprovisions shall be
consistentwith the orbital flight path type, orbital height, and inclination
selected.
DG-CPH-II9. Space station design and layout should make maximum use of
any on-boardmass as radiationshielding.
DG-RSD-120. Protectionof the space stationcrew against the effects of
a nuclear device explosion in space that releases radiation into the space
station'sorbitalpatllshould be considered.
DG-C&W-121. The locationand characteristicsof the radiation detectors
should be consistentwith the expectedradiationenvironment.
DG-INT-122. Radiation effects upon space station electronic materials,
microelectronic circuit elements, electrical systems, metals, ceramics,
polymers, and other organic and inorganic materials should be thoroughly
investigatedfor radiation-inducedtransientand permanenteffects in terms of
false signals,degradation,catastrophicfailures,and contamination.
DG-OPS-123. In low-inclination(up to 60 degrees),low altitude orbits,
Extra-VehicularActivity should not be scheduledwhile the space station is
passing through the South Atlantic Anomaly. For polar orbit, the same
guideline applies. In addition, the occurrence of a solar event should
requirethat EVA be avoided.
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DG-OPS-124. A mission radiationcontrol program should be institutedto
develop radiation exposure limits, procedures, design criteria, and
respQnsibilitiesconsistentwith the expectedmission environmentand period
of orbitalstay.
DG-Ht4S-125.A cumulative radiation exposure record should be kept on
each crew member, and personnelwho have reached the limit of safe radiation
exposureshould be returnedto earth without delay.
DG-INT-126. Provision should be made in the space station for a
designated shelter that would serve as a haven for radiation protection
againstpossiblehigh-intensityradiationevents. This shelter should contain
the necessary life support equipment and provisions consistent with the
maximum expectedstay time for the particularmissionprofile.
DG-HMS-127. Space station radiation monitoring, including cumulative
radiation level records, should be maintained to ensure the precise
determination and provide clear notification of radiation conditions, and
warning of possibleover-irradiationof the space station.
DG-C&W-128. The space station detection system should continuously
monitor the interiorand exteriorradiationlevels and record the accumulated
dosage for the mission.
DG-RSD-129. Additionalprotectionfor crew members performingEVA in the
proximityof a nuclearpower sourceshouldbe provided.
DG-INT-130. Precautionsshould be taken in the selection of spacecraft
materialsto ensurethat the materialswill not supportinducedradiation.
DG-OPS-131. Maintenanceproceduresfor C02 controlequipment should take
into accountthe possible high operatingtemperaturesof the equipmentand the
possibilityof releaseof contaminants.
DG-OPS-132. The storage and disposal of combustible waste materials
should be such that a fire hazardor trafficobstructionis not created.
DG-INT-133. Flame arrestors should be provided in all ducting through
which flame could propagate.
DG-INT-134. Cryogenic piping systems should provide for both automatic
and manual emergencyshutoff.
DG-EPG-135. Adequate cooling capability should be provided to prevent
overheatingof electricalpower sourceseven duringworst-caseconditions.
DG-INT-136. Power generating and distribution equipment which is a
potentialsourceof fire should be located in unpressurizedareas in the space
station.
DG-INT-137. Fire control equipment and/or methods should be provided
which can be automaticallyinitiated,or are readily accessible and can be
manuallycontrolled.
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DG-INT-138. Electrical insulation should be, as a minimum,
self-extinguishingin the space stationatmosphere.
DG-INT-139. Power equipmentracks and cables should be as resistant to
fire as possible. Emergency equipment and casualty mode/damage control
operationsshouldbe developed.
DG-INT-140. A11 fluid lines should be adequatelyprotectedfrom freezing
due to proximityto cryogenics,or exposureto black space.
DG-INT-141. Heating elements which must be exposed to the atmosphere
shouldbe providedwith a device to preventthe propagationof flame.
DG-C&W-142. Areas where radioactivematerialsare used or stored should
be monitored for radioactivecontamination,and suitablewarnings provided if
radioactivity exceedsestablished Iimits.
DG-INT-143. Components which could generate excessive heat due to
frictionshould be automaticallymonitoredfor temperatureincreaseand sealed
from the atmosphere. An overheatwarning signalshould be provided.
DG-INT-144. The amounts of hypergolic, pyrophoric, or other easily
ignitablematerials on board the space station should be restricted to the
minimum necessary,and close control should be exercisedover their handling
and use.
DG-INT-145. Potential ignition sources, such as lighted cigarettes or
open flames, etc., should not be permittedwithin the pressurizedinhabited
compartment of the space station unless rigid control can be exercised to
insurethat a fire hazardis not present.
DG-INT-146. If absence of oxygen is utilized as a means of preventing
fires, design should provide that no single failure could produce an oxygen
atmosphere.
DG-INT-147. Passagewaysshould be kept free of all combustiblematerials
and oxidizers.
DG-MSE-148. Lubricantsused in mechanicalcomponentswhich are essential
for survivalshould be capableof withstandingextremetemperatures.
DG-ECS-149. A capabilityfor manuallycontrollingoperationof equipment
used for cabin and equipmenttemperaturecontrol shouldbe considered.
DG-EPD-150. Current limiting devices or techniques should be used to
preclude hazardous overcurrents. Devices should be readily accessible,
provide visible indicationof their state, and be resistantto inadvertentor
accidental de-activiation, fire, explosion, shock and explosive
decompression. They should provide protectionboth to the current source and
to the "using"equipment.
DG-INT-151. Design provisionsshould be made which assure that no heated
surfaceswould provide a source of injury to crew members or provide a source
of ignition.
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DG-FSE-152. Propellantsupply system equipment and plumbing which uses
toxic or potentiallyflammablefluidsshould be locatedin uninhabitedareas.
DG-INT-153. Equipment which has a critical temperature requirement
shouldbe protectedby redundantor alternatetemperaturecontrolcapability.
DG-INT-154. Materials which are capable of self-propagationof fire
should not be on-board the space station in sufficient quantities or
concentra--_Tonsthat ignitionwould result in a hazardouscondition.
DG-ECS-155. Valves for oxygen systems of 3000 PSI or higher should be
slow opening and closing to minimize the possibility of ignition of
contaminants.
DG-ECS-156. Space station thermal protection provisions should be
consistent with the orbital flight path, orbital height, and inclination
selected.
DG-ECS-157. Thermal control equipment whose operation is critical to
crew safetyshould have redundancyprovided.
DG-ECS-158. Temperaturesensors should be providedat criticalpoints in
thermal control systems to detect out-of-tolerancetemperatures. Detectionof
temperatureswhich deviate from the normal range should activate an alarm
system to warn the crew of the need for remedialaction.
DG-INT-159. Procedures should be established and design safeguards
providedthat will precludeoperationof thrusterswhen it might endangercrew
members involvedin EVA.
DG-AOM-160. Sensors should be provided to monitor the temperature of
attitude control thruster assemblies. The sensors should activate visual
and/or audiblealarm at the command and controlcenter(s).
DG-AOM-161. Angular rates of the space station should be continuously
monitored during attitude change maneuvers. Detection of excessive angular
rates should resultin automatic/controlledshutdownof operatingthrusters.
DG-AOM-162. An automatic system for controllingthrusters to restore a
tumblingspace station'sstability,shouldbe provided.
DG-AOM-163. Redundancy should be provided for all components that are
located outside pressurizedinhabitedareas and failure of which could result
in a loss of attitudecontrol.
DG-AOM-164. The attitude maintenancesystem should have the capability
to counteractthe undesiredmotion imparted by fluid escaping through a hole
in a compartmentor pressurevessel.
DG-AOM-165. Interlocksshould be provided to prevent simultaneousmanual
and automaticoperationof the attitudecontrol system.
DG-AOM-166. A means for stopping propellant flow to failed OPEN
thrustersshould be provided.
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DG-INT-167. Outlets should be designed so that fluids being vented
overboarddo not imposeany torque on the spacecraft.
DG-FSE-168. Propellantsshould be stored in more than one tank or other
storagedevice.
DG-INT-169. Accesswaysbetween and within compartmentsshould be sized
in such a manner that an IVA-suitedcrew member will be allowed to access to
normallyused areas.
DG-STR-170. I1atcheshould be capable of being operatedfrom either side
and at least two methodsfor operatingthe hatchesshould be provided.
DG-ECS-171. Space station airlocks should have redundantpressurization
capability.
DG-INT-172. An alternate command and control center should be provided
in the space station, possibly within the crew refuge area, to ensure
continuationof a minimum numberof functionswhich are vital for base control
and crew life support,in the event the primary command and control center is
renderedincapableof providingthese functions.
DG-INT-173. Capability should be provided to allow entry into a
compartment, where fire or other emergency exists, to effect rescue of
incapacitatedcrew members or to combat a fire. The means of entry and the
procedures involved should assure that the emergency does not escalate or
spreadto other locationsin the space station.
DG-OPS-174. 14issionrules should include the requirement that control
center "authorityto proceed" be obtained immediatelyprior to the initiation
(by any crewmember)of any activitywhich is hazardous either by itself, or
when performed in conjunction with other base activities being conducted
simultaneously.
DG-C&W-175. Closed circuit televisionsystem with strategicallylocated
'camerasshould providecommand and controlcenter operator(s)real-timevisual
informationon hazardousactivities/operations.
DG-OPS-176. Simultaneousoccupancy (other than momentary) by the space
stationcommanderand his deputy,of those compartmentsor locationswhich are
judged to have the highest safetyrisk probability,should be minimized.
DG-COM-177. Equipmentin the space station for external voice and data
communications should have as much commonality as practicable with the
equipmentused in the logisticsvehiclesand earth-returnvehicles.
DG-AOM-178. Continuousindicationof space station attitude or attitude
changes shouldbe providedto the commandand controlcenter(s).
DG-OPS-179. Crew activity should be restricted during transfer of
volatile, flammable,or explosivematerials either between docked spacecraft,
the logisticsvehicle,or within the space station. These restrictionsshould
apply to the use of high voltage equipment, conduct of high temperature
experiments,or other activity which would involve a potential source of
ignitionin the immediateneighborhoodof the materialtransferroute.
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DG-OPS-180. The number of crew members in any compartmentat one time
should be held to a minimum necessaryto performthe requiredfunctions.
DG-OPS-181. Crew members should be restrictedfrom movement about the
stationother than within specifiedand assignedareas.
DG-INT-182. The areas in which the crew spends most of its time
(staterooms, dining facilities, personal hygiene areas, exercise and
recreationareas) shouldbe designedas the safest partsof the space station.
DG-C&W-183. Critical visual/audibleC&W alarms should be displayed in
all inhabitedcompartments.
DG-COM-184. An independent emergency communicationssystem should be
provided for directing and controlling operationalactivities in emergency
situations.
DG-OPS-185. A sufficient number of logistics and/or rescue vehicles
should be docked to the space station at all times to accomodate every
on-boardcrew member in the event that emergencyevacuationis required.
DG-COM-186. Independentemergencycommunicationsshould be provided to
assist EVA personnelin performingtheir tasks or to facilitaterescue of EVA
personnel.
DG-EPD-187. Emergencylighting system should be provided to assist EVA
personnelin performingtheir task or to facilitaterescueof EVA personnel.
DG-OPS-188. Periodic drills for all personnel should be devised, and
conducted in response to unscheduled simulated emergencies, so that crew
proficiencyis maintainedin emergencyprocedures.
DG-OPS-189. "Fire Resistant" areas should be established to provide
haven from fire. Emergencyproceduresshould be establishedto identify such
things as optimum routes to haven from any area, and all personnel should be
trained in these procedures.
DG-OPS-190. Proceduresshould be establishedand training provided to
the crew which will enable them to cope with any foreseeablecontingencythat
might arise during EVA.
DG-C&W-191. An adequate fire warning system should be provided. The
warning should be activated by smoke or fumes, as well as heat, and should
warn the entire space station. The precise location of the fire should be
provided to the command and control center(s). All segments of the warning
system should be resistantto temperatureextremes,decompression/overpressure
or shock and shouldbe self-indicatingwhen failed.
DG-FSE-192. A means for monitoring fluid quantity usage should be
provided to permit the crew to detect excessive consumption rates and low
remainingsupplylevels.
DG-C&W-193. The commencement,behavior, and completion of all remote
hazardousresupply operations (pressurizedliquid or gas resupply) should be
positivelyindicatedat the command and controlcenter(s).
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DG-OPS-194. Overall health and safety responsibilities should be
assignedto specificmembersof the crew with alternates.
DG-OPS-195. Proceduresshould include tileprovisionsfor abort for all
incoming vehicles having an on-board emergency which would jeopardize the
space station.
DG-EPG-Ig6. An emergencypower sourcewhicilis completelyindependentof
the primarypower source shouldbe provided.
DG-OPS-197. An initial advanced manning team should check habitability
of the space stationprior to duty crew manning.
DG-COM-198. A visual warning should be providedto the commandcenter(s)
when any link of the space stationcommunicationsystemfails.
DG-COM-199. At least one intercommunicationstation should be provided
for each separately pressurizable space station compartment that can be
occupiedby the crew.
DG-INT-200. The maintenanceequipment,proceduresand skills requiredto
completely analyze and isolate component failures and accomplish the needed
replacementor repair shouldbe provided.
DG-C&W-201. Critical subsystemsof docked transientvehicles should be
continuouslymonitored in the space station command and control center(s),
with appropriatewarningsfor out-of-toleranceconditions.
DG-OPS-202. All EVA and IVA suited activities shall be backed up and
monitored by a suited crew member who is in a position to provide immediate
assistance.
DG-OPS-203. A periodic,two-way communicationscheck should be made by
the command and control center with all elements that comprise the space
station. A "no communications"period would automatically intiate space
stationemergencyprocedures.
DG-OPS-204. Armable subsystemsthat comprise the space station and its
docked vehiclesshould be armed only when they are to be used and immediately
disarmedwhen their functionis no longerrequired.
DG-INT-205. The pressurizedcompartmentsof a space station should have
adequate free volume (not occupied by equipmentor structure)to provide the
crew freedom of movement and a psychologicaland physiologicalenvironment
that is commensuratewith their orbital stay duration.
DG-C&W-206. Leak detectors should be provided for propellant handling
equipment located in unpressurizedareas of the space station. The detectors
shouldactivatean alarm at the commandand controlcenter(s).
DG-INT-207. Replacementcomponents should be designed so that it is
impossibleto inadvertentlyinstallthe componentincorrectly.
DG-INT-208. Universallysized, minimum time to don or place, survival
devices should be made availableto the crew.
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DG-INT-209. All switches should be designed and located so that the
possibilityof inadvertentactivationor improperselectionis minimized.
DG-_4SE-210.Design of mechanisms shall minimize the number of moving
parts or other maintenancetask generators.
DG-FSE-211. Small clearances in fluid system should be avoided where
fluid entrained particulants could cause binding or jamming of system
components.
DG-STR-212. Hatch design shallavoid seal abradingin normal operation.
DG-STR-2]3. Provisions shall be made for moisture removal between
transparencypanes.
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AppendixBE
SPACE STATIONHAZARDLIST
The enclosedlist of 148 candidatespace stationhazardsare includedto
incicatesome typicalsafetyconcerns. This list is neitherofficialnor all
inclusive,but is submittedto indicatethe scope of hazardsto be considered.
A similarlist will be generatedwithin each jurisdictionalarea (agency/
contractor),aggregatingthe hazard reporttitles from the safetyassessment
processnoted in AppendixAF. When the Space Stationelectronicnetwork
safety data base comes on-line,this appendixwill be a printoutof the space
stationhazardslist.
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SPACE STATIONCANDIDATEHAZARDLIST
001 Debris ImpairingMechanismFunctioning
002 Entrapmentof CombustibleFluids
003 Failureof DockingSeparationMechanisms
004 Failureof ServicingSeparationMechanisms
005 ContainedSystemsOverpressure
006 InadvertentThrusterFiring
007 InadvertentCommand (Manual/Software)Actuation
008 Ingress/EgressHatch MechanismFailure
009 Heat ExchangerCoil Rupture
OlO HazardousFluid Leakage
Oil ThrusterPrematureShutdown
012 ThrusterFailureto Fire
013 PressurizedTank ExplosiveRupture
014 InsufficientRemainingPropellant
016 BatteryThermalRunaway
017 Failureto Key Connectors
018 Use of Wet TantalumCapacitors
019 MomentaryPower Interrupt
020 Power Transients
021 Loss of Gyro Stability
022 Loss of GuidanceSystem Accuracy
023 Coronaand Arcing
024 EVA Crewman Irradiation
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025 Failureof C&W System to Alert Crew
026 ErroneousAlarm
027 C02 Level not Annunciated
028 Single Fault in ComputerSystems
029 InadequateLockingof Connectors
030 Failureto DeadfaceGuillotineCircuits
031 Mating/DematingConnectorswith Power Applied
032 Unknown Relay State in Startup
033 Damage Susceptibilityto Wiring Harness
034 PayloadDeploy/RetrieveLoss of Power/Control
035 Power InterruptCausesComputerShutdown
036 EMP DisablingCriticalSemi-ConductorCircuitry
037 Loss of AvionicsCoiling
038 Loss of CompartmentAir Control
039 02/N2 Tank Explosion
040 Free Water Short in ElectricalEquipment
041 Contaminationof PotableWater
042 Fire SuppressionSystem Fails to ExtinguishFire
043 Non-Restraintof Cre_nanUsing PortableFire Extinguisher
044 Loss of Airlock Life Support
045 Loss of Access to "Safe Haven"
046 Fire in HabitableCompartment
047 CorrosiveFluid Spills in HabitableCompartments
048 Leakingof HazardousFluidsDuring Fluid Transfer
049 ContaminatiOnby RadiativeMaterials
050 Contaminationby Chemical/BiologicalContaminants
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051 Inabilityto IsolateCriticalFunction
052 PressureShell PenetrationFrom Shrapnel
053 Collisionof High Mass Objectswith Space Station
054 Sharp Edges and Corners
055 Hypoxia in a I0.2 PSIA Atmosphere
056 InadequateMonitoringand Overrideof AutomaticFunctions
057 Collisionbetween Orbiterand Space Station
058 Collisionbetween OTV and Space Station
059 Space StationCollisionwith Space Debris
060 No Exit from HabitableVolume
061 Delayed Reactionto EmergencyEVA
062 Non-IonizingRadiationInterference
063 Inabilityto Transferto RescuingOrbiter
064 Space StationOrbit Decay
065 Loss of Pressurizationin AdjacentModule During Docking/Undocking
066 Loss of Life SupportDuring/AfterEmergency
067 Space Station Spinup from AssymetricalVenting
068 Cross Contaminationof HabitableVolumes
069 CompartmentOverpressurizationfrom Heat/Fire
070 UndetectedFluid Leaks and PressureLoss
071 HazardousMaterialsin HabitableVolumes
072 RadiationLevels ExceedingAllowables
073 Efflux Impingementon Space Station
075 Poor Space Station Housekeeping
076 Inabilityto InspectTie Down Restraints
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077 Near Space StationContainerExplosion/Rupture
078 Combinationof MutuallyReactiveFluids in or near Space Station
079 NonopropellentDecompositionor Leakagein or near Space Station
080 InadvertentStart of Upper Stage RocketMotor in Vicinityof Space
Station
081 Collisionof Loose Upper Stage Partswith Space Station
082 Loss of Controlof Upper Stage in Vicinityof Space Station
083 Inabilityto Dock Upper Stage to Space Station
084 Inabilityto Dock Orbiterto Space Station
085 ContaminatedSpace StationEquipmentand Crew
086 Glare Blankingof Remote Video Cameras
087 Protrusionsinto High TrafficAreas
088 Hatch Blow-lnfrom Inter-VolumePressureDifferentials
089 Inabilityof CriticalSubsystemsto WithstandHabitableVolume
Depressurization
090 Propagationof ECS Failureto Other HabitableVolumes
091 Smoke Inhalation
092 Food Poisoning
093 Inabilityto Treat Crew Illnesses/Injuries
094 Disposition/Handlingof Crew Member Remains
095 Crew Member ChronicMotion Sickness
096 BerserkCrewman
097 Cre_manIllnesson EVA
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098 Spread of Pathogenic Bacteria Through Crew Personal Effects
099 Free Floating Internal Debris
I00 Undesired Electrolytic Corrosion
I01 Tumbling Astronaut (EVA)
102 Tumbling Astronaut {IVA)
103 Breakdown in Crew Discipline/Jurisdiction
104 Ergonomic Stresses
105 Deterioration of Maintenance/Repair Quality Control
106 Exposure to Excessive Noise 60 dB(A)
107 Toxic Vapors, Gases, Metals
108 Exposure to Temperature Extremes
109 Electric Shock
II0 Fluid Line Contamination
III Vector (Insect/Rodent) Control
112 Ozone Generation in Habitable Volumes
113 Non-Maintainable Subsystems
114 Contamination from Waste Products
115 Common/Interconnected Water Supply
116 Crack Propagation in Structures and Lines
117 Flying Debris Causedby Rapid Decompression
ll8 HabitableVolume Rapid Decompression
ll9 Hatch Seal Leakage
120 Trapped Fluids
121 Inabilityto InspectPrimaryStructure
122 ElectricalConnectorMismatch
123 Arcing of ElectricalComponents
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124 Wiring HarnessShorts
125 ElectrostaticDischarge
126 SpacesuitBurnthrufrom Hot UtilityLights
127 RotatingMachineryRun Away
128 Interconnectionof Lines at DifferentPressureLevels
129 Ruptureof High PressureLines
130 Water ElectrolysisUnit Cell Reversal
131 Chemical/ThermalBurns to Crew Members
132 CommunicableDiseaseOutbreak
133 Death of Crew Members
135 Death of ExperimentalPlants/Animals
136 Excess 02 PartialPressure
137 NuclearContamination
138 Irradiationof Crew and Equipment
139 Freezing/Disassociationf Lubricantsin Space Environment
140 Violationof CriticalEquipmentEnvironmentalRequirements
141 Loss of Command/ControlCapability
142 Loss of Inter-VolumeCommunication
143 Loss of Space Station-to-GroundCommunications
144 Loss of InternalIllumination
145 UndefinedEscape Routes
146 Depletionof CriticalConsumables
147 InadequateSpares Provisioning
148 Crew Congestionat Work Stations
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